Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-76219'

Red Hat Lightspeed in Satellite analyzes system health and configuration by applying predefined rules to a small set of local data, such as installed packages, running services, and configuration settings.

Red Hat Lightspeed in Satellite analyzes system health and configuration by applying predefined rules to a small set of local data, such as installed packages, running services, and configuration settings.

Red Hat Satellite is a system management solution that allows organizations to configure and maintain their systems without the necessity to provide public Internet access to their servers or other client systems. It performs provisioning and configuration management of predefined standard operating environments. Security Fix(es): * ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy role install leads to arbitrary code execution (CVE-2026-11332) * ansible-core: argument injection in ansible-galaxy collection install via git clone (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-11332) (CVE-2026-16493) * openvox-server: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass (CVE-2026-54512) * puppetserver: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass (CVE-2026-54512) * rubygem-jwt: ruby-jwt: Authentication bypass due to empty key in HMAC verification (CVE-2026-45363) * python-aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Service via malformed HTTP responses (CVE-2026-69244) * python-aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade (CVE-2026-69243) * python-aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Arbitrary code execution via untrusted input to CookieJar.load() (CVE-2026-34993) * openvox-server: jackson-core: Denial of Service via incomplete fix in async JSON parser (CVE-2026-68494) * openvox-server: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections (CVE-2026-10051) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via improper git option validation (CVE-2026-73624) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via kwarg value smuggling (CVE-2026-73625) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Information disclosure via environment variable expansion in URL handling (CVE-2026-73622) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git template (CVE-2026-73623) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file overwrite and read via unsafe git option forwarding (CVE-2026-73620) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options (CVE-2026-42284) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via improper validation of clone options (CVE-2026-42284) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks (CVE-2026-42215) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution due to bypass of dangerous Git option checks (CVE-2026-42215) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration (CVE-2026-44244) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via injected newlines in Git configuration (CVE-2026-44244) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal in .gitmodules submodule names (CVE-2026-76222) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary file creation via path traversal in .gitmodules submodule names (CVE-2026-76222) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git hooks (CVE-2026-76218) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Remote Code Execution via malicious Git hooks (CVE-2026-76218) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution via crafted kwargs (CVE-2026-76220) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary command execution via crafted kwargs (CVE-2026-76220) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via `git read-tree` option injection (CVE-2026-76219) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary File Overwrite via `git read-tree` option injection (CVE-2026-76219) * python-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via config-name injection (CVE-2026-76221) * python3.12-gitpython: GitPython: Arbitrary code execution via config-name injection (CVE-2026-76221)

**Target:** gitpython-developers/GitPython **Tested:** HEAD `07e80555` (2026-07-25), latest release 3.1.55, `git version 2.50.1` ## Summary `Repo.archive()` does call the option guard, so this is not a missing-guard report. The guard is present and working; the **denylist it consults is incomplete**. ```python # git/repo/base.py:169 unsafe_git_archive_options = [ # Allows arbitrary command execution through the remote git-upload-archive command. "--exec", # Writes output to a caller-controlled filesystem path. "--output", "-o", ] ``` The comment on `--output` states the protected class in the project's own words: an option that lets the caller name **a filesystem path** is unsafe. `--output` is blocked because it *writes* to a caller-chosen path. `git archive` also accepts `--add-file=<path>` and `--add-virtual-file=<path:content>` (both present in current git; verified against `git version 2.50.1`). `--add-file` *reads* a caller-chosen path — including an absolute path outside the repository — and places the bytes into the archive the caller receives. Neither option is in the list, and no other layer references them: ``` $ grep -rniE "add.file|add_file" git/ git/index/base.py:771: R"""Add files from the working tree, ... # unrelated docstring ``` Net effect: the guard blocks arbitrary file **write** at this sink while permitting arbitrary file **read** at the same sink. ## Reachability proof (verified at the sink) `poc/poc_addfile.py` at HEAD `07e80555`. The PoC creates its own out-of-tree canary, so it runs from a clean machine: ``` -- CONTROL: options the denylist covers (expect BLOCKED) -- [BLOCKED] output='/tmp/gp_written.tar': --output is not allowed, use `allow_unsafe_options=True` to allow it. [BLOCKED] o='/tmp/gp_written.tar': -o is not allowed, use `allow_unsafe_options=True` to allow it. [BLOCKED] exec='touch /tmp/gp_exec': --exec is not allowed, use `allow_unsafe_options=True` to allow it. -- SIBLING OMITTED FROM THE DENYLIST: --add-file (expect ALLOWED) -- [ALLOWED] add_file='/tmp/gp_canary.txt' -> archive 10240 bytes archive members: ['f.txt', 'gp_canary.txt'] >>> EXFILTRATED gp_canary.txt: 'secret-canary-12345' >>> byte-for-byte match with the out-of-tree file: CONFIRMED -- also: --add-virtual-file (attacker-chosen name AND content) -- [ALLOWED] add_virtual_file='pwn.txt:hello' -> archive 10240 bytes ``` The three blocked lines are the control: they prove the guard is active on this call path, so the fourth result is a gap in list membership rather than a guard that never ran. Minimal reproduction: ```python import io, tarfile from git import Repo buf = io.BytesIO() Repo("/path/to/repo").archive(buf, format="tar", add_file="/etc/passwd") print(tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(buf.getvalue())).getnames()) # ['<repo files>', 'passwd'] <- contents readable by whoever receives the archive ``` The canary is untracked and lives outside the repository; its contents are recovered from the returned archive and asserted byte-for-byte against the on-disk file. The option is rendered by `transform_kwargs` into `--add-file=<path>` and reaches `git archive` unmodified. ## Direct precedent `GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf` (High, published 2026-07-22) is the same defect on the sibling list: *"Incomplete `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`"* — an option absent from one of these denylists, reachable under the same caller-controlled-options precondition, accepted and fixed by adding it. `git log` shows the archive list itself has already been extended reactively once, in `701ce32f` (*fix: Guard unsafe git command options*, GHSA-956x-8gvw-wg5v), and the `--template` omission was then fixed separately in `ffcb5359`. ## `--add-virtual-file` is the same gap pointing the other way `--add-virtual-file=<path:content>` lets the caller inject **attacker-chosen content under an attacker-chosen name** into an archive that downstream consumers will reasonably treat as repository-derived. ## Suggested remediation 1. **Preferred — allowlist.** `Repo.archive()` has a small legitimate option surface (`format`, `prefix`, `worktree_attributes`, `remote`, compression level, plus paths). Accepting those and rejecting the rest means a future git release cannot add another path-taking option that silently reopens this. 2. **Minimum — extend the list** with `--add-file` and `--add-virtual-file`, and make the membership rule *"the option takes a filesystem path or URL"* rather than *"the option executes a command"*. The existing comment on `--output` already implies that rule; applying it consistently is what closes the class instead of this instance. ## Scope limits - Impact is **arbitrary file read at the privileges of the process**. Not code execution — I make no such claim here. - It requires the embedding application to forward caller-influenced kwargs into `Repo.archive()`. That is the identical precondition to `--output`, `--exec` and `--template`,

## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed). ## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional. ## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration. ## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc") # target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...) ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=…)` / `merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)` with attacker `treeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc"`. 2. Check: NONE — the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`. 3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` — no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim']` (last-wins). 4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed. ## Bypass Evidence Independently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')` → victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02…` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=…)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD. ## Affected Versions `GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag). ## Suggested Fix Add a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.

## Summary `IndexFile.from_tree`, `IndexFile.reset` (→ from_tree) and `IndexFile.merge_tree` append caller-influenced treeish strings positionally to `git read-tree` with no unsafe-option guard, no `allow_unsafe_options` parameter, and no `--` separator. `git read-tree --index-output=<file>` writes the resulting index to an arbitrary path, and last-occurrence-wins lets an injected `--index-output` override the method's internal temp path — clobbering an arbitrary file with a valid git-index blob. This is a distinct, never-guarded sink: commit `3af0c251` (GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f) guarded only `checkout_index` and `tag`; `read_tree` was left unprotected (it is among the acknowledged unguarded call sites in that advisory's sweep but was never reported or fixed). ## Root Cause `from_tree` (index/base.py:388), `reset` (delegates to from_tree), and `merge_tree` (index/base.py:291) call `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` with no `check_unsafe_options` and no `--`. The treeish is caller-influenced and positional. ## Impact Arbitrary file overwrite / destruction at the privileges of the host process. Content is constrained to a git-index blob (not attacker-chosen, so not RCE), but the target path is fully attacker-controlled — corrupting/truncating configs or destroying files at attacker-chosen writable locations = I:H + A:H (per the skill's "overwrite-any-path = I:H" rule). Pure VALUE control (positional treeish). Default configuration. ## Proof of Concept ```python IndexFile.from_tree(repo, "--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc") # target overwritten with a valid git-index blob (DIRC...) ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Entry: app calls `IndexFile.from_tree(repo, treeish)` / `reset(commit=…)` / `merge_tree(base=…, rhs=…)` with attacker `treeish="--index-output=/home/victim/.bashrc"`. 2. Check: NONE — the methods have no `allow_unsafe_options` and never call `check_unsafe_options`. 3. Sink: `repo.git.read_tree(*arg_list)` — no `--`. argv (from_tree, observed): `['git','read-tree','--index-output=<tmp>','--index-output=/…/victim']` (last-wins). 4. Impact: target path created/overwritten with a valid git-index blob; existing content destroyed. ## Bypass Evidence Independently reproduced (gate harness): `IndexFile.from_tree(repo,'--index-output=<victim>')` → victim overwritten; before=`IMPORTANT ORIGINAL CONTENT`, after starts `DIRC\x00\x00\x00\x02…` (destructive clobber, valid index blob). `reset(commit=…)` and both `merge_tree` positionals verified. Fix-commit read: `3af0c251` touched only `checkout_index`+`tag`; `read_tree` untouched on HEAD. ## Affected Versions `GitPython <= 3.1.57` (sinks present verbatim on the latest release tag). ## Suggested Fix Add a `check_unsafe_options` guard (with an `allow_unsafe_options` parameter) to `from_tree`/`reset`/`merge_tree`, and/or place a `--` separator before the positional treeish arguments; block `--index-output` (a path-taking option) on this sink.