In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: replace ARPHRD_CAN type checks with can_get_ml_priv()
Commit 4e096a18867a ("net: introduce CAN specific pointer in the struct
net_device") introduced an explicit way to assign the midlayer private
pointer (dev->ml_priv) to named users like ML_PRIV_CAN. A valid pointer
returned by can_get_ml_priv() therefore identifies a real CAN device.
The referenced commit only converted the j1939 and proc code to this
check, while the other parts of the CAN subsystem still rely on
dev->type == ARPHRD_CAN.
The TUNSETLINK ioctl allows a down TUN/TAP device to set its hardware
type to ARPHRD_CAN while dev->ml_priv remains NULL. Such a repurposed
netdevice passes the ARPHRD_CAN checks.
Commit 8aa59e355949 ("can: af_can: fix NULL pointer dereference in
can_rx_register()") already made can_rx_register() reject such devices.
But can_rx_unregister() still only checks dev->type and dereferences
the NULL ml_priv when it walks the receive lists of the device.
CAN_ISOTP reaches this path: isotp_bind() ignores the return values of
can_rx_register() and binds the socket anyway. When the socket is
released or the device is unregistered, isotp_release() and
isotp_notify() remove the filters that have never been registered and
trigger the NULL pointer dereference in can_rx_unregister(). This only
requires owning a TUN/TAP device or CAP_NET_ADMIN in an unprivileged
user namespace.
Convert the remaining ARPHRD_CAN checks in af_can, bcm, gw, isotp and
raw to can_get_ml_priv().