Threats Tagged 'ghsa-4mf4-73j6-mvrw'
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Threats Tagged 'ghsa-4mf4-73j6-mvrw'
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0 ### Impact Many djust built-in component template tags (`djust.components.templatetags.*`) render a developer/user-supplied URL into an `href` / `action` attribute, HTML-escaping it with `conditional_escape` but **never validating the URL scheme**. HTML escaping prevents attribute breakout but does not neutralize a `javascript:` URI (which needs no escapable characters), so a URL value of `javascript:alert(document.cookie)` lands verbatim in `<a href="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">` and executes in the victim's session on click. Affected sinks (executing href/action contexts; not exhaustive): breadcrumb (`djust_components.py:1535`; `_advanced.py:1999,2022`), `dj_nav` link/dropdown/brand (`djust_components.py:5632,5779,5807,5830`), citation URL (`:6936`), cookie-consent privacy link (`:8240`), error-page action (`_advanced.py:1728`), form `action` (`_forms.py:1239`). `<img src>` sinks are lower risk (javascript: does not execute via img src). No scheme validation exists anywhere in the component tags; a docstring at `djust_components.py:781` even acknowledges the `javascript:` risk without mitigating it. **Severity Medium:** XSS in the victim's authenticated session whenever an app renders one of these components with a URL sourced from user-controllable data; for `href` requires a click, worst case is the stored variant (URL persisted from one user, rendered to another). Conditional on developer usage, hence Medium rather than High. Reproduced: `breadcrumb(items=[{"label":"Home","url":"javascript:alert(document.cookie)"}])` emits `<a ... href="javascript:alert(document.cookie)">Home</a>`; `JaVaScRiPt:` case variant also passes; `https://` URLs are preserved. ### Patches Add a `safe_url()` helper that neutralizes non-allowlisted schemes (`javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `data:`) to `#` while preserving http/https/mailto/tel/relative/anchor URLs, and route every href/action/formaction/xlink:href sink through it (then HTML-escape). Add a regression + an audit_ast/system-check rule flagging un-routed URL-attribute interpolation. ### Workarounds Do not pass user-controllable URLs to the affected built-in component tags; pre-validate URL schemes in application code before binding them to component arguments. ### References Reproducer + finding writeup retained privately by the maintainer. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 09/16/2026, 21:51:38 UTC Added: 09/16/2026, 22:02:45 UTC |
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