Threats Tagged 'ghsa-h4ph-crvj-9h92'

# GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369 ## Summary SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied `property` field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...)))` SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation. ## Severity CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H ## Affected Component - **Package:** `pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle` - **File:** `src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php` - **Lines:** 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point) - **Endpoint:** `POST /admin/translation/translations` ## Description The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has `type: "date"`, the `property` field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression: ```php $fieldname = $filter[$propertyField]; // Line 565 — user input $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); // Line 569 — trivially bypassable $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; // Line 577 $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; // Line 593 — injection ``` The `str_replace('--', '')` sanitization is trivially bypassable (use `/**/` comments or `----`). In non-language mode, `$fieldname` is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization. ## Impact Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain. ## Proof of Concept ``` POST /admin/translation/translations filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}] ``` ## Suggested Fix Validate `$fieldname` against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation: ```php $allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate']; if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) { continue; } ``` ## References - CWE-89: SQL Injection - Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path) --- ## Suggested Fix In `TranslationController.php`: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation `UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))` with `$db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)` to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions. ```diff --- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php +++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php @@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages) || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { continue; } + // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection + $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate']; + if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { + continue; + } + if (!$languageMode) { $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname; } @@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') { $operator = '='; - $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))"; + // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions + $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname)); } ``` --- ## Proposed Fix ```diff --- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php +++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php @@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname); if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages) || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { continue; } + // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection + $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate']; + if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) { + continue; + } + if (!$languageMode) { $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;