In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Map flex file layout IDs through the request's user namespace
nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget() and nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() translate
the file's owner and group with init_user_ns, but every other identity
nfsd places on the wire goes through nfsd_user_namespace(). When the
transport carries a credential from a non-initial user namespace, the
flex file layout reports host-global IDs. The client copies those IDs
into the AUTH_SYS credential it presents to the data server, and
svcauth_unix_accept() resolves that credential in the transport's
namespace, so data server I/O runs under an identity unrelated to the
file's owner.
Switching to the request's namespace introduces a second hazard.
from_kuid() returns (uid_t)-1 when the target namespace has no
mapping for the owner, and the IOMODE_READ arm adds one to that
result to derive an identity for which the data server denies
writes. The addition would wrap to zero, handing the client uid 0
instead of an identity distinct from the owner.
Translate both IDs in nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget(), which has the
svc_rqst, and carry the wire values in struct pnfs_ff_layout.
from_kuid_munged() substitutes overflowuid for an unmapped owner and
thus never returns (uid_t)-1, so the increment cannot wrap to zero.