In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: bound the SIT/NAT bitmaps by the checkpoint pack
sit_ver_bitmap_bytesize and nat_ver_bitmap_bytesize are used as memcpy
lengths into and out of sbi->ckpt, which is sized from cp_payload alone,
and nothing compares either length against that allocation.
sanity_check_ckpt() has checked these two fields since c77ec61ca0a4, which
added them after a crafted image overran build_sit_info(). That check ties
each length to a segment count; it never compares either against the
allocation, which is the half this adds.
Mounting over-reads in build_sit_info() and build_node_manager(), and the
first checkpoint writes the same lengths back through the same pointers,
so the over-read's contents reach the on-disk checkpoint. An unmount is
enough; the filesystem does not have to be used.
Bound both ends the way __bitmap_ptr() lays them out. The three branches
differ, so a single sum of the two lengths would still admit a small
overflow when cp_payload is non-zero.