Threats tagged 'ios'

A Russian state-sponsored threat actor known as Midnight Blizzard has conducted a large-scale watering hole campaign targeting iOS and Android devices primarily in the US, Europe, and Ukraine. The campaign involved compromising or cloning high-profile websites to inject malicious JavaScript that fingerprints visitors and delivers exploit chains targeting previously patched vulnerabilities. The iOS exploits leverage the DarkSword exploit kit and include CVE-2024-27834, patched in May 2024. The Android exploits target Chrome and Qualcomm vulnerabilities patched in 2026 and 2025, respectively. The final payloads harvest extensive personal and device data. The campaign also included a supply chain attack on a Ukrainian web analytics service, exposing hundreds of websites to the exploit kit.

Apple released updates for iOS and macOS 27.2 addressing 286 vulnerabilities, including memory corruption bugs, privilege escalation flaws, sandbox escapes, and remote code execution issues. A critical zero-day vulnerability in CoreGraphics, exploited in the wild, was backported and fixed in iOS 18.7.11. The updates also patch numerous security holes in components such as WebKit, kernel, image handling, and network services. Additional patches were released for other Apple operating systems and software.

Signal has released version 8.30, completing the rollout of its secure backups feature across all supported platforms including iOS and desktop apps. This feature allows users to create end-to-end encrypted backups of their chats, either hosted by Signal or stored locally on the device. The backups require a recovery key for decryption, and hosted backups include an additional rotating key for enhanced security. The update introduces local encrypted backups to iOS and desktop, aligns Android backups to a cross-platform format, and improves media storage efficiency. The backup system excludes disappearing messages set to vanish within 24 hours. The new iOS client also supports direct encrypted iPhone-to-iPhone transfers via Wi-Fi Aware. This release marks the completion of Signal's first phase of its backups project.

Apple has released security updates addressing a zero-day vulnerability in CoreGraphics that was exploited in highly sophisticated targeted attacks on iOS devices. The flaw allowed attackers to compromise affected devices, prompting an urgent patch release. No specific affected versions are detailed in the available information.

Readwise Reader for Android version 8.7.2 contains three stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities. These flaws allow attackers who can supply malicious documents or metadata to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the app's WebView context. The vulnerabilities arise from insufficient sanitization of document metadata fields, improper escaping of URL metadata, and permissive sanitization rules for SVG markup. Exploitation could compromise user data confidentiality and integrity, including access to stored documents, credentials, and session tokens. A patch addressing one of the issues is available in version 8.10.1. Users are advised to update when possible and exercise caution when adding content from untrusted sources.

Apple released major updates iOS 27 and macOS Golden Gate 27 that patch over 200 security vulnerabilities affecting kernel and multiple platform components. These flaws could lead to memory corruption, privilege escalation, system termination, and information leaks. The updates also fix a medium-severity Samba heap-based buffer overflow from 2022. No active exploitation has been reported. Users are advised to update promptly to benefit from these fixes.

Cisco disclosed multiple vulnerabilities affecting its Secure Email product, IOS XR, Nexus 9000 series switches, and certain IP phone devices. Two medium-severity flaws in Secure Email's S/MIME decryption could allow attackers to intercept and obtain plaintext from encrypted emails. Critical vulnerabilities in IOS XR and Nexus switches could enable remote code execution, authentication bypass, and code injection. Additionally, a high-severity denial-of-service vulnerability affects Cisco IP phones using SIP. Cisco has released patches for the IOS XR, Nexus switches, and IP phone vulnerabilities, but the Secure Email flaws remain unpatched. No active exploitation has been reported for any of these vulnerabilities.

Researchers have identified a new tactic used by the Chinese Fire Ant threat actor involving Cisco IOS XR routers. The attackers create unauthorized GRE tunnel interfaces on affected routers, which do not correspond to any legitimate configuration or commit history. This technique allows the compromised routers to be leveraged as spying platforms. No specific affected versions or patches have been disclosed. There is no confirmed active exploitation in the wild at this time.

The bugs could be exploited to crash Safari, corrupt memory, leak sensitive data, escape the sandbox, and exfiltrate data. The post Dozens of WebKit Vulnerabilities Patched With Fresh macOS, iOS Security Updates appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Apple today released updates for iOS/iPadOS (26 and 18) and macOS 26. This update fixes 108 vulnerabilities and comes about two weeks after the much smaller macOS update that addressed the single screen-sharing vulnerability. This vulnerability did not affect iOS/iPadOS.

Patches were rolled out for two dozen vulnerabilities, including one with public proof-of-concept (PoC) code. The post Cisco Patches Critical SD-WAN, IOS XE, FMC Vulnerabilities appeared first on SecurityWeek .

A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the in-app browser of the LINE client for iOS. The issue arises from insufficient safeguards when handling arbitrary URL schemes, which may cause the application to become unresponsive or crash. No specific affected versions or patches have been identified in the provided data. There is no evidence of active exploitation in the wild at this time.

iOS Bluetooth PAN Exploit - Ethernet Gateway without Adapter

Over the last year, with recent updates to iOS and Android, RCS (Rich Communication Services) has become an increasingly used protocol [1]. RCS is supposed to eventually replace SMS, and in addition to richer formatting, provides added (but optional) security. RCS messages may be end-to-end encrypted and digitally signed. Unlike SMS, which was "bolted on" to existing voice-focused phone standards. The SMS standard was based on old-fashioned pagers and allowed for limited clear-text communications. RCS is built from the ground up around modern IP-based network infrastructure and behaves more like IP chat services (think iMessage, WhatsApp...). RCS defines the message format, while protocols like SIP are used to establish connections and transport messages.

What do board games and cybersecurity have in common? Pattern recognition. Strategy. Adaptation. In this week’s Threat Source Bill explores why curiosity may be a defender’s most valuable skill.

Researchers show how context manipulation can cause agentic browsers to abandon safety guardrails and exfiltrate sensitive credentials. The post ‘BioShocking’ Attack Tricks AI Browsers Into Stealing Credentials appeared first on SecurityWeek .

The updates fix vulnerabilities in WebKit, the kernel, WebRTC, Web Extensions, and other components affecting iPhone, iPad, Mac, and Safari users. The post Apple Patches Dozens of Vulnerabilities Across iOS, macOS, and Safari appeared first on SecurityWeek .

A new prompt injection attack dubbed "BioShocking" could trick AI-powered browsers into treating real-world risky actions as part of a fictional scenario, causing them to ignore any safety guardrails. [...]

Apple released updates for iOS/iPadOS, macOS, and Safari on Monday. There have been no updates for other Apple operating systems (visionOS, watchOS, tvOS). Usually, Apple updates all products at the same time.

A stolen session cookie sat in underground markets for seven weeks before attackers used it to poison 32 Red Hat packages in the npm software registry, an example of the industrial approach behind modern supply chain attacks. Key takeaways Miasma is a self-propagating npm worm derived from Mini Shai-Hulud that TeamPCP open-sourced on May 12. The public release of the full weaponized toolchain means any operator can now replicate structurally identical supply chain campaigns. The Miasma campaign compromised 89-plus npm packages across three waves (June 1-5), affecting Red Hat, Vapi.ai, and Microsoft Azure repositories. The worm produced malicious packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, defeating the highest tier of supply-chain integrity verification. The root cause was a stolen developer credential that sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization. This infostealer-to-supply-chain pipeline is the defining pattern of the Developer Credential Economy. The Miasma campaign’s third wave (June 5) introduced a significant escalation: persistence files that target AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, VS Code), expanding the attack surface from package registries to the developer’s local environment. Relying on execution-layer detection, such as EDR, is insufficient against supply chain threats because EDR tools lack visibility into the ephemeral CI/CD environments where credential theft and weaponization occur. Organizations should treat developer credentials as control-plane infrastructure and adopt a phased Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) approach: harden the generation layer, neutralize harvested secrets in real time, and enforce human-gated publishing controls. Background on the Miasma worm and npm supply chain attack On June 1, the Miasma self-propagating worm compromised 32 official npm packages under the @redhat-cloud-services namespace, delivering a credential-harvesting payload to an estimated 80,000 to 117,000 weekly downloads. Within five days, the campaign escalated through three distinct attack waves and forced GitHub to disable 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations . The technical details of the Miasma supply-chain attack are alarming: valid Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA) provenance attestations on malicious packages; a novel execution technique that bypasses install-script monitoring; and a new persistence mechanism that targets AI coding assistants. But the most important detail is a timestamp. Dark web monitoring firm Whiteintel detected a Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. A second sighting appeared on May 15. The credential sat in underground markets for approximately seven weeks before attackers weaponized it on June 1. That seven-week gap is the signature of an emerging threat model that Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team calls the Developer Credential Economy , and has been tracking since March 2026. The Developer Credential Economy is a structured black market for highly privileged developer credentials where open-source supply chain compromises function as credential generation infrastructure, underground markets serve as the distribution layer, and multiple threat actors with distinct motivations weaponize the harvested access downstream. The Miasma campaign is the clearest example of this model to date, and it validates a pattern that has been accelerating across the npm, PyPI, and GitHub ecosystems throughout 2026. The three-layer economy, explained through Miasma When it first assessed this pattern in March, Tenable RSO built the analysis around the TeamPCP cascading campaign (Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM, Telnyx, and 66+ npm packages) and the Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Axios compromise . The thesis identified a three-layer structure: credential generation, distribution, and weaponization. Three months later, the Miasma campaign validates each layer with striking clarity. Layer Actor / group Operational focus Primary targets Miasma validation Generation TeamPCP Bulk credential harvesting via tool exploitation Trivy, KICS, TanStack, Red Hat npm scope Miasma's payload sweeps GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and .env files from every infected environment Distribution Underground markets, infostealer aggregators Credential brokering and tooling proliferation Stolen developer credentials; open-sourced worm code Red Hat employee credential sat in infostealer logs for seven weeks before weaponization; Shai-Hulud source published May 12 Weaponization Sapphire Sleet (DPRK-nexus), LAPSUS$, Miasma operator, copycat actors State-sponsored exfiltration, data theft, cascading supply chain compromise Axios (npm), Mercor AI, @vapi-ai/server-sdk, Azure/durabletask Each Miasma wave generates A fresh credential pool, feeding the next wave and enabling downstream actors Layer 1: Credential generation The Developer Credential Economy’s first layer is extraction. Threat actors compromise developer tooling and open-source infrastructure not primarily to distribute malware to end users, but to harvest the credentials those environments contain, such as GitHub tokens, npm publishing tokens, cloud provider credentials, CI/CD secrets, SSH keys, and API keys. TeamPCP pioneered this at scale beginning in September 2025 with the original Shai-Hulud worm. Its defining innovation was cascading credential extraction: compromise one trusted tool, harvest the credentials it holds, and use those credentials to compromise the next tool in the dependency chain. The Trivy vulnerability scanner compromise yielded CI/CD runner secrets. Those secrets enabled the KICS compromise . KICS yielded additional cloud credentials. Each link in the chain generated a broader set of privileged access. By May, TeamPCP had refined this into the Mini Shai-Hulud variant, which introduced two capabilities that made the generation layer dramatically more efficient: Wormable propagation : The malware queries the npm registry for every package the compromised identity can publish, and republishes itself across all of them automatically. CI/CD pipeline hijack via OpenID Connect (OIDC) token extraction : Rather than stealing static credentials, Mini Shai-Hulud requests short-lived OIDC tokens through GitHub Actions, enabling it to publish packages with valid cryptographic provenance. In the Miasma supply chain campaign, this generation layer operated through a Red Hat employee’s compromised GitHub account. The worm’s payload swept the infected environment for: GitHub tokens and personal access tokens npm publishing tokens AWS, GCP, and Azure cloud credentials HashiCorp Vault tokens Kubernetes service account tokens SSH private keys Docker registry credentials GPG keys .env files The June variant added dedicated collectors for GCP and Azure cloud identities, going beyond secret extraction to enumerate all cloud access the infected machine holds. Every machine that ran npm install against a compromised @redhat-cloud-services package version became a credential generation node. Layer 2: Distribution The second layer is the marketplace. Stolen credentials flow from the generation layer into underground markets, infostealer log aggregators, and access brokering services, where they become available to any buyer. The Miasma supply chain-attack timeline makes this layer visible in a way previous campaigns did not. Whiteintel detected the Red Hat employee’s GitHub credential and session cookie in infostealer logs on April 13. That credential was not generated by a targeted supply chain attack against Red Hat; a commodity infostealer harvested it, one of 13.2 million infostealer infections that SpyCloud's 2025 Identity Exposure Report documented as producing an average of 50 credentials per infection. The credential entered the distribution layer as one data point among billions: SpyCloud recaptured 5.3 billion credential pairs, 18.1 million exposed API keys and tokens, and 8.6 billion stolen session cookies from criminal underground monitoring in 2025 alone. For seven weeks, the credential sat in the distribution layer before someone acted on it. That dwell time is the systemic gap that the Developer Credential Economy exploits. Organizations that do not monitor underground markets for exposed developer credentials are operating on the assumption that the generation-to-weaponization pipeline does not exist, or that it operates too slowly to matter. Miasma demonstrates that even a seven-week window, which is long by underground market standards, is more than sufficient for weaponization. The distribution layer was further amplified on May 12, when TeamPCP published the complete Mini Shai-Hulud source code on GitHub under an MIT License with the message “Shai-Hulud: Open Sourcing The Carnage.” The release included CI cache-poisoning scripts, the OIDC token extractor, and the credential stealer with its propagation logic. This is the supply chain equivalent of publishing a working exploit framework: the tooling itself became a distribution channel, lowering the barrier to entry for any operator who wants to run a structurally identical campaign. Layer 3: Weaponization The third layer is operational use. Actors with distinct motivations acquire credentials from the distribution layer and weaponize them against specific targets. In March, the RSO team documented at least three distinct actors operating from the same credential pool : TeamPCP harvested at scale: Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 (DPRK-nexus) operationalized stolen npm tokens for financial gain through the Axios compromise and LAPSUS$ exploited compromised Tailscale VPN credentials from the LiteLLM breach for data theft from Mercor AI. The same credential ecosystem fed all three. Miasma’s weaponization layer continues to evolve, but the trajectory across its three waves demonstrates the pattern: Wave 1 (June 1) used the stolen R