Threats Tagged 't1485'

In April 2026, a manufacturing organization in the Middle East suffered a ransomware attack where threat actors with domain admin privileges weaponized Active Directory Group Policy Objects to achieve domain-wide impact without deploying ransomware binaries on Windows endpoints. The attackers created malicious GPOs linked at the domain root, delivering ransom notes, hijacking wallpapers and lock screens, enforcing logon banners, and disabling local administrator accounts across all domain-joined workstations. No file encryption occurred on Windows systems; instead, the operation focused on encryptionless extortion through operational disruption and data exfiltration. Initial access was gained via compromised VPN credentials. The attack remained dormant for one day between GPO creation and detonation, evading file-based detection entirely by abusing trusted AD infrastructure.

Settra is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2026 that targets organizations through VPNs or compromised credentials. Two incidents were investigated in July and September 2026, affecting the consumer services, retail, and manufacturing sectors. Attackers deployed MeshAgent RMM for persistence, naming ransomware executables after victim domain names. The malicious activity included file encryption with .locked or .locked_wip extensions, deployment of RESTORE_FILES.txt ransom notes, clearing Windows event logs, and disabling Windows recovery options using reagentc and diskpart utilities. One incident featured Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) tactics using gdrv.sys. A notable operational security failure occurred when attackers misspelled the Windows Defender Event Log path, preventing its deletion. Both attacks followed remarkably similar operational patterns, with MeshAgent installations pointing to different C2 IP addresses (45.13.122[.]7 and 193.5.65[.]114), and malicious workstation WIN...

On August 31, 2026, U.S., Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian authorities, collaborating with CrowdStrike and Shadowserver Foundation, successfully disrupted the Sality botnet through a peer-to-peer sinkhole operation. Active since 2003, Sality infects Windows executables and spreads malware for credential theft, spam distribution, and DDoS attacks. The botnet delivered EggJagger clipper malware, stealing at least $150,000 through cryptocurrency wallet substitution. The takedown exploited Sality's P2P architecture weakness by manipulating peer lists, isolating over 15,000 infected machines from threat actor control. This peer list manipulation technique prevented payload distribution by inserting sinkhole entries and removing legitimate peers. Associated domains were seized across U.S. and Europe. While the disruption stops new payloads, existing infections remain active requiring remediation. The operation demonstrates that resilient P2P criminal infrastructure can be dismantled through coordinated law enf...

On August 4, 2026, ChainDrop, a self-propagating worm variant of Mini Shai-Hulud linked to TeamPCP, infiltrated the npm ecosystem through a compromised maintainer account of the keyv ecosystem. The attacker injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, weaponizing legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish poisoned packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, making them indistinguishable from clean releases. ChainDrop spread to over 400 packages within four hours by stealing npm tokens and republishing infected versions. The worm employs Ethereum smart contracts for C2 infrastructure, enabling domain rotation without modifying deployed malware. It features destructive capabilities, wiping victim home directories upon token revocation, and achieves persistence through IDE and AI-agent configuration files. The payload harvests credentials from npm, GitHub, AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, and other services, exfiltrating data via GitHub repositories and EtherHiding techniques.

In this article Pre-encryption Encryption Post-encryption Defending against DeadLock ransomware Indicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion process. This architecture likely increases the resilience of portions of its communication, leak-hosting, and negotiation infrastructure, allowing DeadLock operators to recover from some disruption efforts while maintaining continuity for victims. Microsoft has observed DeadLock ransomware being deployed by multiple groups including an affiliate of the Lynx and INC ransomware ecosystems. First observed in July 2025, DeadLock operators employ double extortion tactics, encrypting victim environments while threatening to publicly release exfiltrated data. As of July 2026, the operators have published more than 80 compromised organizations on their data leak site, called the DeadLock blog, with more than half of the claimed victims in Europe. Microsoft identified DeadLock ransomware impacting organizations across information technology (IT), mining, transportation and logistics, manufacturing, hospitality, consumer goods, and other sectors in Europe, Asia, North America, South America, and Africa. The DeadLock encryptor includes a resource-aware throttling mechanism designed to maintain system responsiveness during encryption. In addition to its encryption capabilities, the ransomware also appears to implement language or country-based geofencing designed to avoid running in environments associated with former Soviet and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)-linked countries as well as select Middle Eastern countries, a pattern commonly observed among ransomware operators believed to operate from those regions. Together, these capabilities demonstrate how DeadLock combines established ransomware tradecraft with decentralized infrastructure designed to improve operational resilience. In this blog, we present a technical analysis of the DeadLock ransomware encryptor, covering its execution flow, defense evasion techniques, encryption design, and post-encryption behaviors, including a decentralized recovery chat system. We also provide indicators of compromise (IOCs), Microsoft Defender detections, and mitigation guidance to help organizations defend against this threat and similar ransomware activity. Pre-encryption Configuration parsing Before performing any malicious activity, the DeadLock encryptor decrypts an embedded configuration blob using XOR decoding with an 8-byte key. Below are the malware’s configuration fields and their values. Field Value Victim UID Malware public key 03bf50bbf97c4e951e66ff12b689a37a3ce675b4921e254eae76da77573843e4a9 Encryption rule 1000,05052429880,025124288000,010524288000,F991114288000 Language exclude list Geofencing language IDs (see Language geofencing ) Process stop list Processes to terminate (see Process and service termination ) Service stop list Services to stop and delete (see Process and service termination ) File exclude list Extensions and file names to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Directory exclude list Pre-traversal filter with directories to avoid encrypting (see Directory traversal ) Sub-path Exclude List Sub-paths to avoid encrypting during traversal (see Directory traversal ) Text ransom note Full text ransom note content (see Ransom notes deployment ) HTML recovery chat Full HTML/JS interactive chat page (see Recovery chat: Technical architecture ) Language geofencing As an early exit check, the malware queries the system’s default and user interface (UI) languages. If either language matches the exclude list in the configuration, the malware self-deletes immediately withou…

A sophisticated spear-phishing campaign targeted individuals in research, policy, and academic fields through emails disguised as materials from an actual academic conference. The attack leveraged a cloud storage link delivering a malicious ISO file containing a PIF executable disguised as a PDF document. The multi-stage loader used EMBED_PAYLOAD_v2 structure to embed both legitimate documents and malicious payloads, which were sequentially extracted and executed in memory. Shellcode injection into explorer.exe ultimately deployed a RokRAT variant communicating with cloud-based C2 infrastructure via pCloud, Dropbox, and Yandex Cloud. The campaign demonstrated advanced social engineering by exploiting information from a real event, combined with sophisticated evasion techniques including process injection and cloud-based command-and-control operations. Attribution analysis linked the activity to APT37 based on infrastructure overlap, code similarities, and operational patterns.

In October 2025, Microsoft Threat Intelligence discovered GigaWiper, a sophisticated Golang-based backdoor that combines command-and-control capabilities with multiple destructive payloads. This versatile implant consolidates functionality from at least three separate malware families: a standalone wiper operating at physical disk level, a destructive component derived from Crucio ransomware that encrypts files with randomly generated unsaved keys, and a reimplemented version of FlockWiper with enhanced multi-pass secure wiping. The backdoor provides 20 different commands enabling threat actors to maintain control, execute operations, collect system information, and trigger destructive actions on demand. GigaWiper establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, communicates via RabbitMQ and Redis servers, and can perform disk wiping, fake ransomware encryption, screen recording, VNC-like remote control, and system-level sabotage including BSOD triggers and event log clearing.

In early 2026, a threat actor targeted SD-WAN infrastructure at a service provider, exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN to escalate privileges. The attacker initially gained access through unauthorized peering connections and manipulated default account passwords. They then exploited CVE-2026-20245, a privilege escalation flaw in the file upload feature, by uploading a malicious CSV file to achieve root-level access. The vulnerability allowed the creation of a privileged user account through manipulation of system password files. Throughout the intrusion, the threat actor employed extensive anti-forensic techniques, systematically deleting malicious files, restoring modified system configurations, and executing validation scripts to ensure removal of indicators. This campaign demonstrates the living off the edge paradigm, where adversaries compromise network appliances to bypass traditional security perimeters and maintain persistent access.

CriticalVulnerabilityUnited StatesCanadaUnited Kingdom+12#cve#cve-2026-20127#credential manipulation

Since late 2025, cybercriminals have been exploiting Wallpaper Engine, a popular live wallpaper application on Steam, to distribute malware through Steam Workshop. Attackers target primarily Chinese and Russian gamers by embedding malicious code within application wallpapers shared on the platform. These compromised wallpapers deliver various malware types including infostealers, backdoors, crypto miners, and ransomware. One analyzed sample dropped DarkKomet backdoor while hijacking Steam sessions to steal account credentials. The malware modifies system libraries to locate Steam installations and exfiltrate data to attacker-controlled servers. Compromised accounts are then used to upload additional malicious wallpapers. The diverse malware families suggest multiple independent hacking groups are exploiting this distribution method. Infected wallpapers received thousands of downloads before removal, with 89% of infections occurring in China.

MediumMalwareBritish Indian Ocean TerritoryCanadaChina+5#account hijacking#vidar#wallpaper engine

Microsoft Threat Intelligence discovered a large-scale npm supply chain attack compromising 32 malicious packages across over 90 versions under the @redhat-cloud-services scope. The compromise originated from the RedHatInsights/javascript-clients CI/CD pipeline, enabling attackers to publish trojanized packages through legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC workflows with authentic provenance signatures. The malicious packages executed a heavily obfuscated 4.29 MB dropper via npm preinstall hooks, which downloaded the Bun JavaScript runtime and launched payloads designed to harvest credentials from GitHub, npm, AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes, and developer systems. The malware scraped GitHub Actions runner memory for secrets, escalated privileges using passwordless sudo, exfiltrated stolen data through GitHub infrastructure, and propagated by compromising additional maintainer packages with forged SLSA provenance. The campaign marker "Miasma: The Spreading Blight" was embedded throughout the malicious