The TensorLake npm SDK version 0.5.144 was compromised in a supply chain attack involving ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud malware. The malicious package, downloaded approximately 12,000 times weekly, contains obfuscated code that steals credentials from various sources such as npm tokens, GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes configs, SSH keys, and AI development tools. It executes via a preinstall hook, establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, and supports remote code execution. The attack uses an Ethereum contract for command-and-control and includes a dead-man switch that triggers destructive actions if stolen GitHub tokens are revoked. The malware can self-propagate by republishing compromised versions to other npm packages linked to the victim's publishing identity, spreading across the npm ecosystem.
On August 4, 2026, ChainDrop, a self-propagating worm variant of Mini Shai-Hulud linked to TeamPCP, infiltrated the npm ecosystem through a compromised maintainer account of the keyv ecosystem. The attacker injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, weaponizing legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish poisoned packages with valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations, making them indistinguishable from clean releases. ChainDrop spread to over 400 packages within four hours by stealing npm tokens and republishing infected versions. The worm employs Ethereum smart contracts for C2 infrastructure, enabling domain rotation without modifying deployed malware. It features destructive capabilities, wiping victim home directories upon token revocation, and achieves persistence through IDE and AI-agent configuration files. The payload harvests credentials from npm, GitHub, AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, and other services, exfiltrating data via GitHub repositories and EtherHiding techniques.
A large-scale software supply chain attack compromised over 400 npm packages through a self-propagating worm called ChainDrop, a new variant of Mini Shai-Hulud. The campaign exploits stolen npm publishing credentials to automatically modify and republish legitimate software releases. ChainDrop targets developer workstations and CI/CD environments, harvesting credentials from npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, and HashiCorp Vault before validating access and enumerating resources. The malware uses preinstall lifecycle scripts for automatic execution, establishes persistence through repository configuration modifications, and abuses GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing workflows. After stealing credentials, it autonomously propagates by downloading packages, inserting malicious payloads, and republishing them with incremented versions, demonstrating how compromised developer identities can enable widespread ecosystem compromise.
A self-propagating npm worm dubbed ChainDrop infected over 400 packages downloaded hundreds of millions of times weekly, including popular packages like keyv and cacheable-request. The worm steals cloud credentials, npm and GitHub tokens, SSH keys, and sensitive developer data while extracting temporary credentials from GitHub Actions runner memory. It uses stolen npm publishing tokens to infect additional packages while maintaining their legitimate functionality. The attackers established persistence through VS Code and Claude Code configurations, employed blockchain-based command-and-control resolution via Ethereum smart contracts, and can execute attacker-supplied code. The operator demonstrated ability to silently reconfigure C2 infrastructure through Ethereum transactions without updating deployed instances. ChainDrop employs three layers of obfuscation and encryption, exfiltrates data through encrypted channels, and publishes stolen tokens in public commit messages.
A sophisticated software supply chain attack named ChainDrop has infected hundreds of npm packages, including popular caching libraries with millions of weekly downloads. Beginning August 4, 2026, attackers compromised a GitHub account of a keyv package maintainer, injecting malicious code into legitimate repositories. The malware executes credential-stealing payloads targeting developer workstations and CI/CD runners, harvesting npm tokens, GitHub credentials, cloud access keys, SSH keys, and database credentials. Using stolen credentials, the worm self-propagates by compromising additional repositories and publishing poisoned packages with valid provenance attestations. ChainDrop employs Bun runtime for execution, establishes persistence through developer tool configurations, and exfiltrates encrypted data using blockchain-based command-and-control infrastructure. This campaign represents an evolution of the Shai-Hulud npm worm.
On August 4, 2026, a sophisticated supply chain attack compromised the keyv npm package maintainer, deploying CHAINDROP, a self-propagating worm that automatically backdoors packages using stolen npm credentials. Over 400 npm packages were infected, affecting more than 1.3 billion monthly downloads. The worm executes via preinstall hooks, deploys across Linux, macOS, and Windows platforms, and harvests credentials from over 300 patterns targeting AI tooling, cloud providers, GitHub tokens, and npm credentials. CHAINDROP uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 resolution and propagates by publishing trojanized versions of packages the compromised maintainer can access. The payload is heavily obfuscated and contains Dune-themed references consistent with previous Shai-Hulud campaigns.
Attackers compromised a GitHub maintainer account controlling keyv, cacheable, flat-cache, and file-entry-cache Node.js packages that collectively receive over a billion downloads monthly. Malicious code was pushed directly to the main branch and automatically published to npm with valid signatures. A hidden preinstall script downloads a Bun runtime to execute an obfuscated payload that harvests npm, GitHub, AWS, Kubernetes, and Vault credentials, scans for SSH keys and environment files, and exfiltrates data to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories and Ethereum smart contracts. The worm then uses stolen npm tokens to infect additional packages autonomously. This self-propagating attack, tracked as ChainDrop, belongs to the Shai Hulud family responsible for previous campaigns targeting TanStack, Mistral AI, and OpenSearch packages in May 2026.