Threats Tagged 'ubuntu-cve-2026-73623'
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Threats Tagged 'ubuntu-cve-2026-73623'
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## Summary GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration. ## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense. ## Impact Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H. ## Proof of Concept ```python # attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x) from git import Repo Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>') # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified) ``` ## Attack Chain 1. Setup: attacker stages `<dir>/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem). 2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>')`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate `['--template']`, no error). 3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created). ## Bypass Evidence Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory. ## Affected Versions `<= 3.1.53` ## Suggested Fix Add `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`. --- Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 08/14/2026, 09:45:06 UTC Added: 08/13/2026, 12:52:11 UTC |
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