Threat database

Golioth Pouch version 0.1.0, prior to commit 1b2219a1, contains a heap-based buffer overflow in BLE GATT server certificate handling. server_cert_write() allocates a heap buffer of size CONFIG_POUCH_SERVER_CERT_MAX_LEN when receiving the first fragment, then appends subsequent fragments using memcpy() without verifying that sufficient capacity remains. An adjacent BLE client can send unauthenticated fragments whose combined size exceeds the allocated buffer, causing a heap overflow and crash; integrity impact is also possible due to memory corruption.

Golioth Firmware SDK version 0.19.1 prior to 0.22.0, fixed in commit 0e788217, contain an out-of-bounds read due to improper null termination of a blockwise transfer path. blockwise_transfer_init() accepts a path whose length equals CONFIG_GOLIOTH_COAP_MAX_PATH_LEN and copies it using strncpy() without guaranteeing a trailing NUL byte, leaving ctx->path unterminated. A later strlen() on this buffer (in golioth_coap_client_get_internal()) can read past the end of the allocation, resulting in a crash/denial of service. The input is application-controlled (not network by default).

Golioth Firmware SDK version 0.10.0 prior to 0.22.0, fixed in commit d7f55b38, contain an out-of-bounds read in LightDB State string parsing. When processing a string payload, a payload_size value less than 2 can cause a size_t underflow when computing the number of bytes to copy (nbytes). The subsequent memcpy() reads past the end of the network buffer, which can crash the device. The condition is reachable from on_payload, and golioth_payload_is_null() does not block payload_size==1. A malicious server or MITM can trigger a denial of service.

Golioth Firmware SDK version 0.10.0 prior to 0.22.0, fixed in commit 48f521b, contain a stack-based buffer overflow in Payload Utils. The golioth_payload_as_int() and golioth_payload_as_float() helpers copy network-supplied payload data into fixed-size stack buffers using memcpy() with a length derived from payload_size. The only length checks are guarded by assert(); in release builds, the asserts are compiled out and memcpy() may copy an unbounded payload_size. Payloads larger than 12 bytes (int) or 32 bytes (float) can overflow the stack, resulting in a crash/denial of service. This is reachable via LightDB State on_payload with a malicious server or MITM.