Threat database

Magistrala through version 1.0.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows authenticated workspace members to manipulate device certificates belonging to other tenants. By supplying foreign serial numbers or entity IDs, attackers can view, issue, and revoke certificates across tenant boundaries, potentially disconnecting devices and minting unauthorized CA-signed certificates.

Magistrala before 1.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the timescale-reader and postgres-reader HTTP API services that allows authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary SQL by supplying a malicious format query parameter that is interpolated directly into the FROM clause without parameterization or identifier quoting. Attackers with a self-registered account can substitute arbitrary subqueries to achieve cross-tenant database reads, extract pg_shadow password hashes, read and write arbitrary files, and execute arbitrary code as the postgres OS user by loading attacker-supplied shared objects, with all injected SQL executing at superuser privilege due to the default PostgreSQL role configuration.

Magistrala (formerly Mainflux)'s message-readers API reads a value from the HTTP query string (readers/api/http/transport.go) with no validation and interpolates it directly into raw SQL queries via fmt.Sprintf in both the PostgreSQL reader (readers/postgres/messages.go: ) and the TimescaleDB reader (readers/timescale/messages.go, same pattern), enabling SQL injection by any authenticated user able to query channel messages.

Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal).