CVE-2026-49473 affects the @cedar-policy/authorization-for-expressjs middleware versions prior to 0.3.0. The vulnerability arises from a mismatch in how the middleware and Express.js handle request URLs: the middleware uses req.originalUrl (including query strings) for authorization checks, while Express routes requests based only on the path component. This discrepancy allows an attacker to bypass stricter authorization policies by appending query strings to requests, causing the middleware to authorize less restrictive actions incorrectly. The issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.
CedarJava is an open source Java implementation of the Cedar policy language, used for fine-grained authorization decisions. In versions prior to 4.9.0, the EntityIdentifier.equals() has inverted null/self branches which could lead to incorrect equality comparisons. The EntityIdentifier.equals() method has inverted logic for null and self-reference checks, returning true for null comparisons and false for self-comparisons. This does not affect Cedar authorization decisions (computed in Rust from JSON), but could affect integrators who perform their own equality checks on entity identifiers. This issue has been fixed in version 4.9.0.
CedarJava is an open source Java implementation of the Cedar policy language, used for fine-grained authorization decisions. In versions prior to 2.3.6, 3.4.1 and 4.9.0, under certain circumstances, improper input handling could allow Cedar-expression injection via unescaped toCedarExpr(). The toCedarExpr() method on Cedar Value types does not escape special characters (" or \) when converting values to Cedar source code. If an integrator uses toCedarExpr() to build policy text at runtime from user-controlled values, an actor could inject arbitrary Cedar expressions. For example, injecting || true into a permit ... when { ... } clause could make the permit unconditional, or injecting && false into a forbid clause could prevent the forbid from triggering. This issue requires the integrator to use toCedarExpr() to build policy text at runtime from user-controlled input. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 2.3.6, 3.4.1, and 4.9.0.
CedarJava is an open source Java implementation of the Cedar policy language, used for fine-grained authorization decisions. In versions prior to 2.3.6, 3.4.1 and 4.9.0, under certain circumstances, improper input handling could allow Record-to-Entity type confusion across the Java-Rust FFI boundary. CedarJava sends authorization requests to the Rust cedar-policy evaluator as JSON. The JSON protocol reserves magic single-key object shapes (__entity and __extn) for entity references and extension values. When serializing a CedarMap, there is no validation preventing these reserved keys from being used. If an integrating service builds a CedarMap from caller-supplied key/value data (such as request headers, user-defined metadata, or resource tags), an actor who controls those keys could cause the Rust evaluator to interpret a record as an entity reference. This issue requires the integrating service to build a CedarMap where the an actor controls the keys, and a policy must reference that value in a when/unless clause. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 2.3.6, 3.4.1, and 4.9.