Threat database

Storybook versions from 8.0.0 up to but not including 8.6.19, 9.0.0 up to 9.1.21, 10.0.0 up to 10.6.2, and 11.0.0-alpha.0 up to 11.0.0-alpha.6 contain a vulnerability where the development server exposes its WebSocket authentication token over a local network. An attacker on the LAN can obtain this token and exploit weak validation in story file writing to place malicious code. If the Vitest addon is installed with an outdated Vitest version, this can lead to arbitrary file writes or command execution with developer privileges. The issue is fixed in versions 8.6.19, 9.1.21, 10.6.2, and 11.0.0-alpha.6.

**Summary:** A malicious website may be able to cause unauthorized file changes in a developer’s project while an affected Storybook development server is running. Under additional conditions, a changed file could be executed by a local runtime with the developer’s privileges. We are not aware of exploitation in the wild. ## Who is impacted? You are impacted if you run a Storybook dev server in the affected versions. You are not impacted if: - You run a dev server that you never open in a web browser (e.g. headless automation, MCP clients) - You run or visit a built version of Storybook Recent versions of Chrome and Firefox may ask for permission before a website can connect to a `localhost` service. This reduces the risk, but does not remove it. Do not grant this permission to websites you don’t trust. ## Recommended actions ### Upgrade Storybook Storybook has released patched versions of all affected major Storybook versions that fix all the vulnerabilities necessary for the worst-case scenario above to occur. Upgrade to a patched version listed below before running `storybook dev` again. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not run an affected Storybook dev server until you can apply the fix. - 11.0.0-alpha.6 - 10.6.2 - 9.1.21 - 8.6.19 ### Review potentially breaking changes Due to the exceptional nature of the reported vulnerabilities, the Storybook team has decided to change the default behavior of Storybook, including versions 8 and 9, for several network-related features that are not essential to most Storybook users' workflow. If your team relies on the affected features, we've added feature flags that can disable specific security updates to support your existing workflows. Please carefully read the introduced flags and the consequences of using them. #### Iframe embedding over the network is disabled by default Storybook no longer allows the manager or preview to be embedded as an iframe on a website with a different host name. Built versions of Storybook are unaffected and can be freely embedded. If you rely on embedding a Storybook dev server through a separate web app, run that separate app on `localhost`. You may also use the `security.insecureRemoteIframeEmbed` feature flag to re-enable iframe embedding from any origin. #### The preview iframe rejects messages sent by an unknown host Both the Storybook preview and manager now restrict the origin of iframes and parent windows that they can send messages to and receive messages from using the `postMessage` API. By default, Storybook in dev mode only accepts communication with its own origin and other `localhost` services. Built Storybooks continue to accept communication from unknown origins. A Storybook addon or integration could hypothetically rely on `postMessage` to update a live story's args. If you do that, reach out to the Storybook team to explore safer alternatives. Storybook composition also relies on `postMessage`, so a composed Storybook on a different origin now fails to load unless it has been built. The `security.insecureIframeMessaging` feature flag disables this protection, but we recommend you build composed Storybooks instead. #### The `highlight` event signature has changed Storybook’s own accessibility addon uses the `highlight` event to inject highlights into the preview, which a user can click. Clicking the highlight opens a menu with a link to a documentation page. The API for that event was too permissive and could be used to trigger arbitrary events, including events processed by the user’s dev server. We reworked the API to prevent abuse. Besides the accessibility addon, Chromatic's Visual Tests addon uses this API to link to documentation from highlighted ignored elements. Update the Visual Tests addon to version 5.5.1 or later to keep that link working. Because no other addons use this API as far as we know, we have not added a feature flag to restore the old API. ## Disclosure timeline On September 30th, the Storybook team received a responsible disclosure showing how a malicious website can embed a Storybook dev server's preview iframe and send events to the dev server on the developer's machine. They combined this information with findings from an ongoing security audit to come up with a worst-case-scenario exploitation of the disclosed vulnerability, and the ones we independently discovered. They then worked to address all layers necessary for this worst-case scenario to happen. We have not received evidence of exploitation in real Storybook projects. The attack outlined in this advisory relies on correctly exploiting a sequence of many vulnerabilities, some of which were never disclosed to the Storybook team. ### Worst-case attack scenario An attacker-controlled website can interact with the preview of a running Storybook dev server. With user interaction, it may cause the dev server to make unauthorized changes to story files. If a malicious file is subsequently executed by a loc

TeleJSON prior to 6.0.0 contains a DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerability in the parse() function that allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript by delivering a crafted JSON payload containing a malicious _constructor-name_ property value. The custom reviver passes the constructor name directly to new Function() without sanitization when recreating object prototypes, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript through vectors such as postMessage in cross-frame communication contexts to achieve script execution within the application.

Storybook is a frontend workshop for building user interface components and pages in isolation. Prior to versions 7.6.23, 8.6.17, 9.1.19, and 10.2.10, the WebSocket functionality in Storybook's dev server, used to create and update stories, is vulnerable to WebSocket hijacking. This vulnerability only affects the Storybook dev server; production builds are not impacted. Exploitation requires a developer to visit a malicious website while their local Storybook dev server is running. Because the WebSocket connection does not validate the origin of incoming connections, a malicious site can silently send WebSocket messages to the local instance without any further user interaction. If the Storybook dev server is intentionally exposed publicly (e.g. for design reviews or stakeholder demos) the risk is higher, as no malicious site visit is required. Any unauthenticated attacker can send WebSocket messages to it directly. The vulnerability affects the WebSocket message handlers for creating and saving stories. Both are vulnerable to injection via unsanitized input in the componentFilePath field, which can be exploited to achieve persistent XSS or Remote Code Execution (RCE). Versions 7.6.23, 8.6.17, 9.1.19, and 10.2.10 contain a fix for the issue.

Storybook is a frontend workshop for building user interface components and pages in isolation. A vulnerability present starting in versions 7.0.0 and prior to versions 7.6.21, 8.6.15, 9.1.17, and 10.1.10 relates to Storybook’s handling of environment variables defined in a `.env` file, which could, in specific circumstances, lead to those variables being unexpectedly bundled into the artifacts created by the `storybook build` command. When a built Storybook is published to the web, the bundle’s source is viewable, thus potentially exposing those variables to anyone with access. For a project to potentially be vulnerable to this issue, it must build the Storybook (i.e.run `storybook build` directly or indirectly) in a directory that contains a `.env` file (including variants like `.env.local`) and publish the built Storybook to the web. Storybooks built without a `.env` file at build time are not affected, including common CI-based builds where secrets are provided via platform environment variables rather than `.env` files. Storybook runtime environments (i.e. `storybook dev`) are not affected. Deployed applications that share a repo with your Storybook are not affected. Users should upgrade their Storybook—on both their local machines and CI environment—to version .6.21, 8.6.15, 9.1.17, or 10.1.10 as soon as possible. Maintainers additionally recommend that users audit for any sensitive secrets provided via `.env` files and rotate those keys. Some projects may have been relying on the undocumented behavior at the heart of this issue and will need to change how they reference environment variables after this update. If a project can no longer read necessary environmental variable values, either prefix the variables with `STORYBOOK_` or use the `env` property in Storybook’s configuration to manually specify values. In either case, do not include sensitive secrets as they will be included in the built bundle.