Skip to main content

Blurring the Lines: Intrusion Shows Connection With Three Major Ransomware Gangs

Medium
Published: Mon Sep 08 2025 (09/08/2025, 22:59:08 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

An intrusion began with a user downloading and executing a malicious file impersonating DeskSoft's EarthTime application, which deployed SectopRAT malware. The threat actor used multiple malware families, including SystemBC and Betruger, and various tools for reconnaissance and lateral movement. They moved across systems using RDP and Impacket's wmiexec, maintaining persistence through local account creation and startup folder shortcuts. Data was collected using WinRAR and exfiltrated via WinSCP to an FTP server. The discovery of tools linked to Play ransomware, DragonForce ransomware, and RansomHub suggests the threat actor was likely an affiliate operating across multiple ransomware groups.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 09/09/2025, 11:44:01 UTC

Technical Analysis

This security threat involves a sophisticated intrusion campaign initiated by a user downloading and executing a malicious file masquerading as DeskSoft's EarthTime application. This initial infection vector deployed SectopRAT malware, which is known for its capabilities in reconnaissance and persistence. The threat actor leveraged multiple malware families, including SystemBC and Betruger, to facilitate lateral movement and maintain control over compromised systems. The attackers utilized Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and Impacket's wmiexec tool to move laterally within the network, demonstrating advanced operational security and evasion techniques. Persistence was maintained through the creation of local user accounts and the use of startup folder shortcuts, ensuring continued access even after system reboots. Data collection was performed using WinRAR to archive sensitive information, which was then exfiltrated via WinSCP to an external FTP server. Notably, the presence of tools and indicators linked to three major ransomware groups—Play ransomware, DragonForce ransomware, and RansomHub—suggests that the threat actor is likely an affiliate operating across multiple ransomware gangs. This multi-affiliation blurs traditional lines between ransomware groups and complicates attribution and defense efforts. The campaign demonstrates a high level of operational sophistication, combining multiple malware families and tools to achieve reconnaissance, lateral movement, persistence, data exfiltration, and potential ransomware deployment.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, this threat poses significant risks to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical data and systems. The use of multiple malware families and lateral movement techniques increases the likelihood of widespread compromise within networks, potentially affecting multiple departments or subsidiaries. Data exfiltration activities threaten sensitive corporate and personal data, which could lead to regulatory penalties under GDPR and damage to organizational reputation. The involvement of ransomware gangs implies a high risk of subsequent ransomware deployment, which could result in operational disruption, financial losses from ransom payments, and costs associated with incident response and recovery. European entities with remote access enabled via RDP or those lacking robust network segmentation are particularly vulnerable. The multi-group affiliation of the threat actor complicates detection and response, as indicators of compromise may vary and evolve rapidly. Additionally, the use of legitimate tools like WinRAR and WinSCP for malicious purposes challenges traditional signature-based defenses, necessitating advanced behavioral monitoring.

Mitigation Recommendations

European organizations should implement a multi-layered defense strategy tailored to this threat's characteristics. First, enforce strict controls on software downloads and execution, including application whitelisting and user education to prevent execution of impersonated applications like the fake EarthTime. Harden RDP access by disabling it if not required, or securing it with multi-factor authentication, strong passwords, and network-level authentication. Monitor and restrict the use of administrative tools such as Impacket's wmiexec, and implement robust logging and alerting for unusual lateral movement activities. Employ endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting persistence mechanisms like local account creation and startup folder modifications. Network segmentation should be enforced to limit lateral movement opportunities. Monitor data archiving and transfer activities, particularly the use of WinRAR and WinSCP, with anomaly detection to identify unauthorized data exfiltration. Regularly audit user accounts and remove unnecessary local accounts. Finally, maintain up-to-date backups isolated from the network to enable recovery in case of ransomware deployment. Incident response plans should be updated to address multi-affiliate ransomware threats and include threat intelligence sharing with relevant European cybersecurity authorities.

Need more detailed analysis?Get Pro

Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://thedfirreport.com/2025/09/08/blurring-the-lines-intrusion-shows-connection-with-three-major-ransomware-gangs/"]
Adversary
null
Pulse Id
68bf5fbcf445a2c7c0a21ee8
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Ip

ValueDescriptionCopy
ip45.141.87.55
ip80.78.28.149

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash12011c44955fd6631113f68a99447515
hash27f7186499bc8d10e51d17d3d6697bc5
hash5675a7773f6d3224bfefdc01745f8411
hash71f703024c3d3bfc409f66bb61f971a0
hash829a9dfd2cdcf50519a1cec1f529854b
hash88df27b6e794e3fd5f93f28b1ca1d3d0
hash95c96de7dcb5a643559ac66045559cc9
hashabb2a6a0f771ab20ce2037d2c4ef5783
hashc6f92d1801d7d212282a6dd8f11b44fe
hashe963d598a86c5ee428a2eefa34d1ffbb
hash142294249feb536e0edbe6e2de3eb3c3415ecf39
hash2114d655805f465d11b720830d150c145039bcd4
hash4f4f8cf0f9b47d0ad95d159201fe7e72fbc8448d
hash52332ce16ee0c393b8eea6e71863ad41e3caeafd
hash5bf41754bfb3a18611b2a02f7f385960ed24f8e1
hash68b6d0cc1430e2d4f70e2ba5026d1c4847324269
hashac0fcbc148e45e172c9be0acf9c307186f898803
hashc0e5e4b5fcbd0a30b042e602d99a6ee81ad5d8d7
hashd15d45d9d9a8ef7a9f048d74b386f620f3b82576
hashf24fc14f39c160b54dc3b2fbd1eba605ec0eb04f
hash18f0898d595ec054d13b02915fb7d3636f65b8e53c0c66b3c7ee3b6fc37d3566
hash6f9326224e6047458e692cd27aeb1054b9381c67aaf2fe238dbebfbc916c4b33
hasha4bc6bebabb52ed9816987b77ebae6ef70e174533a643aea6265bdf1ed9b8952
hasha7240d8a7aee872c08b915a58976a1ddee2ff5a8a679f78ec1c7cf528f40deed
hashae7c31d4547dd293ba3fd3982b715c65d731ee07a9c1cc402234d8705c01dfca
hashaeaf7cc7364a44b381af9f317fe6f78c2717217800b93bee8839ab3e56233254
hashbcff246f0739ed98f8aa615d256e7e00bc1cb24c8cabaea609b25c3f050c7805
hashc92c158d7c37fea795114fa6491fe5f145ad2f8c08776b18ae79db811e8e36a3
hashe1521e077079032df974c7ae39e4737cdb4f05c6ded677ed5446167466eeb899
hashf8810179ab033a9b79cd7006c1a74fbcde6ed0451c92fbb8c7ce15b52499353a

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domain504e1c95.host.njalla.net
domain504ec1c95.host.njalla.net

Threat ID: 68c012ef6cae0adff416b7dc

Added to database: 9/9/2025, 11:43:43 AM

Last enriched: 9/9/2025, 11:44:01 AM

Last updated: 9/9/2025, 9:10:13 PM

Views: 5

Actions

PRO

Updates to AI analysis are available only with a Pro account. Contact root@offseq.com for access.

Please log in to the Console to use AI analysis features.

External Links

Need enhanced features?

Contact root@offseq.com for Pro access with improved analysis and higher rate limits.

Latest Threats