CVE-2023-29061: Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) FACSChorus · Missing Authentication
Affects Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) FACSChorusSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.2 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 31% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 Nov 2023
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD) FACSChorus | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate CVE-2023-29061 effectively, European organizations should implement the following specific measures: 1) Immediately enforce physical security controls around FACSChorus workstations, including restricted access to laboratory areas and surveillance to prevent unauthorized physical access. 2) Where possible, configure BIOS passwords manually on all affected devices to prevent unauthorized BIOS access; if the vendor does not provide a patch, organizations should engage with BD support for guidance or firmware updates. 3) Implement hardware-based security features such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and secure boot to limit unauthorized boot modifications. 4) Maintain strict inventory and asset management to quickly identify affected devices and monitor their physical security status. 5) Conduct regular audits of BIOS settings and system configurations to detect unauthorized changes promptly. 6) Train laboratory personnel on the risks of physical access vulnerabilities and enforce policies to prevent unauthorized device handling. 7) Develop incident response plans that include procedures for BIOS compromise scenarios to minimize downtime and data integrity risks. 8) Collaborate with BD and industry groups to stay informed about patches or firmware updates addressing this vulnerability.
Description
There is no BIOS password on the FACSChorus workstation. A threat actor with physical access to the workstation can potentially exploit this vulnerability to access the BIOS configuration and modify the drive boot order and BIOS pre-boot authentication.