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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-35871: Linux kernel · riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High · fixed in 5.15.0-1065.71~20.04.1 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 28 Oct 2026, 10:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 5.15.0-1065.71~20.04.1, 5.15.0-1068.77~20.04.1, 5.15.0-1065.73~20.04.1 +45
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 May 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinuxpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-38.38
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-38.38
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-awspkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1011.12
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1011.12
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-azurepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1010.10
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1010.10
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-gcppkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gcp?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1010.11
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1010.11
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-gkepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gke?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1006.9
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1006.9
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-ibmpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-ibm?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1008.8
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1008.8

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the registers it returns. 4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code. 5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.

References

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