CVE-2025-0672: WSO2 Identity Server as Key Manager · Vulnerability
Affects WSO2 Identity Server as Key ManagerSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.3 Low.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 11% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 23 Sep 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| WSO2 WSO2 Identity Server as Key Manager | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should implement the following specific measures: 1) Immediately audit and verify that user deletion processes also remove all associated FIDO registration data to prevent stale credentials from persisting. 2) Implement additional checks during user account creation to detect and prevent reuse of usernames that have associated FIDO credentials from deleted accounts. 3) Enforce strict account lifecycle management policies, ensuring that identity and authentication artifacts are fully purged upon account deletion. 4) Monitor authentication logs for anomalies such as unexpected FIDO authentications on newly created accounts with reused usernames. 5) Restrict privileged access to user management functions to minimize the risk of improper account deletions or creations. 6) Engage with WSO2 for patches or updates addressing this vulnerability and plan timely deployment once available. 7) Consider implementing multi-factor authentication methods that do not solely rely on FIDO credentials or adding additional verification steps for account re-creation scenarios. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on lifecycle management of authentication data and proactive detection of anomalous authentication events.
Description
An authentication bypass vulnerability exists in multiple WSO2 products when FIDO authentication is enabled. When a user account is deleted, the system does not automatically remove associated FIDO registration data. If a new user account is later created using the same username, the system may associate the new account with the previously registered FIDO device. This flaw may allow a previously deleted user to authenticate using their FIDO credentials and impersonate the newly created user, resulting in unauthorized access. The vulnerability applies only to deployments that utilize FIDO-based authentication.