CVE-2025-34500: Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 · Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key
Affects Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 24 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc. Deck Mate 2 | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
The vendor has released firmware updates that correct the update-chain weaknesses and disabled USB update access on affected units. Applying these official firmware updates is the primary mitigation. Since USB update access is disabled, the attack surface is significantly reduced. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed in the advisory, so verify with the vendor for current remediation guidance.
Description
Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.
References
- ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf (opens in a new tab)
- wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/ (opens in a new tab)
- wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/ (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain (opens in a new tab)