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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-34500: Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 · Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

Affects Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.0High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 24 Oct 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc. Deck Mate 2Affected
  • =0
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

The vendor has released firmware updates that correct the update-chain weaknesses and disabled USB update access on affected units. Applying these official firmware updates is the primary mitigation. Since USB update access is disabled, the attack surface is significantly reduced. Patch status is not explicitly confirmed in the advisory, so verify with the vendor for current remediation guidance.

Description

Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.

References

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