CVE-2025-48925: TeleMessage service · Use of Password Hash Instead of Password for Authentication
Affects TeleMessage serviceSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 19% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 May 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| TeleMessage service | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate this vulnerability, European organizations should implement the following specific measures: 1) Avoid relying solely on client-side hashing for authentication; instead, enforce server-side hashing with strong, slow hashing algorithms like bcrypt, Argon2, or PBKDF2 combined with unique salts per user. 2) Employ multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the risk of compromised credentials leading to unauthorized access. 3) Monitor network traffic for signs of hash interception or replay attacks, and consider deploying network-level protections such as TLS encryption to protect authentication data in transit. 4) Restrict privileges to minimize the risk of attackers gaining the necessary access to exploit the vulnerability (since PR:L is required). 5) Educate users about the risks of using weak or reused passwords, as MD5 hashes of weak passwords are easier to crack. 6) Engage with TeleMessage to obtain updates or patches and plan for timely deployment once available. 7) Consider alternative secure messaging solutions if immediate remediation is not feasible. 8) Conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing focusing on authentication mechanisms to detect similar weaknesses.
Description
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.