CVE-2025-48931: TeleMessage service · Use of Weak Hash
Affects TeleMessage serviceSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.2 Low.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.09% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 0% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 May 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| TeleMessage service | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
European organizations should prioritize the following specific mitigation steps: 1) Immediately audit the TeleMessage service deployments to identify affected versions using MD5 for password hashing. 2) Engage with the vendor to obtain timelines for patches or updates that replace MD5 with a secure password hashing algorithm such as Argon2, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 with appropriate salting and iteration counts. 3) Where possible, implement compensating controls such as enforcing multi-factor authentication (MFA) to reduce the impact of compromised passwords. 4) Conduct password resets for all users of the affected service to invalidate potentially compromised hashes. 5) Monitor logs and network traffic for suspicious activities indicative of credential theft or brute force attempts. 6) Educate users on the importance of unique, strong passwords to mitigate risks from password reuse. 7) If source code or configuration access is available, modify the service to replace MD5 hashing with a secure alternative immediately. 8) Implement strict access controls and encryption for stored password hashes to prevent unauthorized access. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on vendor engagement, proactive password management, and layered security controls tailored to the specific weakness in the TeleMessage service.
Description
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.