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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-55013: CybercentreCanada assemblyline · Relative Path Traversal

Affects CybercentreCanada assemblylineSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.2 Medium · fixed in 4.6.1 : update CybercentreCanada assemblyline when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 11:07 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.2Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 47% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 9 Aug 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

AI-suggested

European organizations should take the following specific mitigation steps: 1) Upgrade all Assemblyline 4 Service Client deployments to version 4.6.1.dev138 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed. 2) Ensure that all communications between Assemblyline clients and servers are encrypted and authenticated using strong TLS configurations to prevent MITM attacks. 3) Implement strict network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure of Assemblyline servers and clients to trusted networks only. 4) Employ file system monitoring and integrity checking on systems running Assemblyline clients to detect unauthorized file writes or modifications, particularly outside expected directories. 5) Review and harden the configuration of Assemblyline deployments to minimize privileges of the service client process, reducing potential impact of arbitrary file writes. 6) Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing focusing on the Assemblyline infrastructure to identify potential weaknesses in deployment and communication security. 7) Educate security teams about the risks of path traversal vulnerabilities and the importance of validating all inputs from external services, even trusted ones. These measures go beyond generic patching advice by emphasizing secure deployment architecture, communication security, and active monitoring tailored to the Assemblyline environment.

Description

The Assemblyline 4 Service Client interfaces with the API to fetch tasks and publish the result for a service in Assemblyline 4. In versions below 4.6.1.dev138, the Assemblyline 4 Service Client (task_handler.py) accepts a SHA-256 value returned by the service server and uses it directly as a local file name.A malicious or compromised server (or any MITM that can speak to client) can return a path-traversal payload such as `../../../etc/cron.d/evil` and force the client to write the downloaded bytes to an arbitrary location on disk. This is fixed in version 4.6.1.dev138.

References

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