CVE-2025-55069: AutomationDirect CLICK PLUS C0-0x CPU firmware · Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Affects AutomationDirect CLICK PLUS C0-0x CPU firmwareSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 23% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 23 Sep 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| AutomationDirect CLICK PLUS C0-0x CPU firmware | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
1. Immediate Network Segmentation: Isolate affected PLCs from general IT networks and restrict access to trusted management networks only. 2. Implement Strict Access Controls: Use firewalls and access control lists (ACLs) to limit communication to and from the PLCs, allowing only authorized devices and personnel. 3. Monitor Network Traffic: Deploy anomaly detection systems to identify unusual communication patterns or attempts to exploit the vulnerability. 4. Disable Unnecessary Services: Turn off any non-essential services or interfaces on the PLC to reduce attack surface. 5. Vendor Engagement: Maintain close contact with AutomationDirect for timely patch releases or firmware updates addressing this vulnerability. 6. Incident Response Preparedness: Develop and test response plans specific to PLC compromise scenarios, including backup and recovery procedures. 7. User Awareness: Train operational staff to recognize and report suspicious activities that might indicate exploitation attempts. 8. Cryptographic Best Practices: Where possible, implement additional layers of cryptographic protection external to the PLC to mitigate risks from compromised keys. 9. Firmware Integrity Verification: Regularly verify firmware integrity using out-of-band methods to detect unauthorized modifications. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on operational technology-specific controls and proactive monitoring tailored to the industrial environment.
Description
A predictable seed in pseudo-random number generator vulnerability has been discovered in firmware version 3.60 of the Click Plus PLC. The vulnerability relies on the fact that the software implements a predictable seed for its pseudo-random number generator, which compromises the security of the generated private keys.