CVE-2025-59029: PowerDNS Recursor · Reachable Assertion
Affects PowerDNS RecursorSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 31% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Dec 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PowerDNS Recursor | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
1. Monitor PowerDNS official channels for patches or updates addressing CVE-2025-59029 and apply them promptly once available. 2. If immediate patching is not possible, consider deploying network-level protections such as rate limiting or filtering DNS queries with qtype ANY from untrusted sources to reduce the attack surface. 3. Implement DNS query logging and anomaly detection to identify unusual patterns indicative of exploitation attempts involving crafted records or ANY queries. 4. Use DNS firewalling or response policy zones (RPZ) to block or redirect suspicious queries. 5. Deploy redundant DNS resolvers with diverse software stacks to ensure continuity if one resolver is affected. 6. Regularly audit and update DNS infrastructure configurations to minimize exposure. 7. Educate network operations teams on this vulnerability to enable rapid response to potential incidents. 8. Consider isolating recursive DNS resolvers from direct internet exposure where feasible, restricting access to trusted clients only.
Description
An attacker can trigger an assertion failure by requesting crafted DNS records, waiting for them to be inserted into the records cache, then send a query with qtype set to ANY.