CVE-2025-59703: Improper Access Control
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical · fixed in 13.6.12 : patch affected systems as a priority.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 11:42 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 40% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 13.6.12
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Dec 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
Mitigation should focus on strengthening physical security controls around Entrust nShield HSM deployments. Organizations must enforce strict access controls to data centers and server rooms, including multi-factor authentication for physical entry, surveillance, and security personnel presence. Regular inspection of HSM devices for tamper labels and physical integrity is critical to detect any unauthorized access attempts. Entrust should be engaged to provide firmware updates or hardware revisions that enhance tamper detection and resistance against F14-style attacks. Where possible, deploying HSMs in secure, locked cabinets or safes with additional tamper sensors can add layers of defense. Organizations should implement strict operational procedures for handling and maintaining HSMs, including logging and auditing physical access events. Additionally, consider using complementary cryptographic protections such as key splitting or multi-party computation to reduce risk from single-device compromise. Incident response plans must include procedures for suspected physical tampering and key compromise scenarios. Finally, organizations should evaluate alternative HSM solutions with stronger physical tamper protections if remediation is delayed.
Description
Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a Physically Proximate Attacker to access the internal components of the appliance, without leaving tamper evidence. To exploit this, the attacker needs to remove the tamper label and all fixing screws from the device without damaging it. This is called an F14 attack.
References
- entrust.com/use-case/why-use-an-hsm (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-6q4x-m86j-gfwj (opens in a new tab)
- entrust.com/knowledgebase/hardware/understanding-nshield-security-advisory-september-2025 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-h78c-68qv-3qg9 (opens in a new tab)