CVE-2025-61778: CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing in akkadotnet akka.net
Akka.NET is a .NET port of the Akka project from the Scala / Java community. In all versions of Akka.Remote from v1.2.0 to v1.5.51, TLS could be enabled via our `akka.remote.dot-netty.tcp` transport and this would correctly enforce private key validation on the server-side of inbound connections. Akka.Remote, however, never asked the outbound-connecting client to present ITS certificate - therefore it's possible for untrusted parties to connect to a private key'd Akka.NET cluster and begin communicating with it without any certificate. The issue here is that for certificate-based authentication to work properly, ensuring that all members of the Akka.Remote network are secured with the same private key, Akka.Remote needed to implement mutual TLS. This was not the case before Akka.NET v1.5.52. Those who run Akka.NET inside a private network that they fully control or who were never using TLS in the first place are now affected by the bug. However, those who use TLS to secure their networks must upgrade to Akka.NET V1.5.52 or later. One patch forces "fail fast" semantics if TLS is enabled but the private key is missing or invalid. Previous versions would only check that once connection attempts occurred. The second patch, a critical fix, enforces mutual TLS (mTLS) by default, so both parties must be keyed using the same certificate. As a workaround, avoid exposing the application publicly to avoid the vulnerability having a practical impact on one's application. However, upgrading to version 1.5.52 is still recommended by the maintainers.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
CVE-2025-61778 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Akka.NET's Akka.Remote module in versions 1.2.0 up to but not including 1.5.52. Akka.NET is a .NET implementation of the Akka actor model framework originally from Scala/Java, widely used for building distributed, concurrent applications. The vulnerability stems from improper TLS implementation: while server-side private key validation was enforced for inbound connections, the client side was never required to present a certificate, meaning mutual TLS (mTLS) was not implemented. This allowed unauthenticated clients to connect to Akka.NET clusters secured with TLS, bypassing authentication controls. The flaw is categorized under CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass), CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation), and CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function). The issue affects deployments using the akka.remote.dot-netty.tcp transport with TLS enabled. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability remotely without authentication or user interaction, gaining unauthorized access to the cluster and potentially intercepting or injecting messages. The patch in version 1.5.52 enforces mutual TLS by default, requiring both client and server to present valid certificates signed with the same private key, and introduces fail-fast behavior if private keys are missing or invalid. Organizations running Akka.NET in private networks that rely on TLS for security are vulnerable if they have not upgraded. Workarounds include avoiding public exposure of Akka.NET services, but upgrading is strongly recommended to fully mitigate the risk. No known exploits are currently reported in the wild, but the high CVSS score (9.3) reflects the critical nature of the vulnerability and its potential for severe impact.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to the confidentiality and integrity of distributed applications built on Akka.NET. Unauthorized access to Akka.NET clusters could allow attackers to intercept sensitive data, manipulate message flows, or execute unauthorized commands within the cluster, potentially disrupting business-critical services. Industries such as finance, telecommunications, manufacturing, and public sector entities that use Akka.NET for distributed processing or microservices architectures are particularly at risk. The vulnerability's network-level exploitability without authentication means attackers can potentially gain footholds inside corporate networks or cloud environments. This could lead to lateral movement, data breaches, or service disruptions. Given Europe's stringent data protection regulations like GDPR, exploitation could also result in regulatory penalties and reputational damage. The lack of mutual TLS enforcement undermines the security assurances of TLS, making existing encryption deployments insufficient to prevent unauthorized access. Organizations that expose Akka.NET services externally or have weak network segmentation are especially vulnerable. The critical severity and ease of exploitation necessitate urgent remediation to prevent potential compromise.
Mitigation Recommendations
The primary mitigation is to upgrade all Akka.NET deployments to version 1.5.52 or later, which enforces mutual TLS by default and introduces fail-fast checks for private key validity. Organizations should audit their Akka.NET usage to identify affected versions and ensure timely patching. Network administrators should verify that TLS is properly configured with mutual authentication enabled, ensuring both client and server certificates are validated against trusted certificate authorities. Avoid exposing Akka.NET services directly to public networks; instead, restrict access via VPNs or secure internal networks with strict firewall rules. Implement network segmentation to isolate Akka.NET clusters from untrusted zones. Monitor network traffic for anomalous connections to Akka.NET ports and enable logging to detect unauthorized access attempts. Conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on Akka.NET components. Additionally, review certificate management practices to ensure private keys are securely stored and rotated regularly. Educate development and operations teams about the importance of mutual TLS and secure configuration to prevent similar issues in the future.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Ireland
CVE-2025-61778: CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing in akkadotnet akka.net
Description
Akka.NET is a .NET port of the Akka project from the Scala / Java community. In all versions of Akka.Remote from v1.2.0 to v1.5.51, TLS could be enabled via our `akka.remote.dot-netty.tcp` transport and this would correctly enforce private key validation on the server-side of inbound connections. Akka.Remote, however, never asked the outbound-connecting client to present ITS certificate - therefore it's possible for untrusted parties to connect to a private key'd Akka.NET cluster and begin communicating with it without any certificate. The issue here is that for certificate-based authentication to work properly, ensuring that all members of the Akka.Remote network are secured with the same private key, Akka.Remote needed to implement mutual TLS. This was not the case before Akka.NET v1.5.52. Those who run Akka.NET inside a private network that they fully control or who were never using TLS in the first place are now affected by the bug. However, those who use TLS to secure their networks must upgrade to Akka.NET V1.5.52 or later. One patch forces "fail fast" semantics if TLS is enabled but the private key is missing or invalid. Previous versions would only check that once connection attempts occurred. The second patch, a critical fix, enforces mutual TLS (mTLS) by default, so both parties must be keyed using the same certificate. As a workaround, avoid exposing the application publicly to avoid the vulnerability having a practical impact on one's application. However, upgrading to version 1.5.52 is still recommended by the maintainers.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
CVE-2025-61778 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting Akka.NET's Akka.Remote module in versions 1.2.0 up to but not including 1.5.52. Akka.NET is a .NET implementation of the Akka actor model framework originally from Scala/Java, widely used for building distributed, concurrent applications. The vulnerability stems from improper TLS implementation: while server-side private key validation was enforced for inbound connections, the client side was never required to present a certificate, meaning mutual TLS (mTLS) was not implemented. This allowed unauthenticated clients to connect to Akka.NET clusters secured with TLS, bypassing authentication controls. The flaw is categorized under CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass), CWE-295 (Improper Certificate Validation), and CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function). The issue affects deployments using the akka.remote.dot-netty.tcp transport with TLS enabled. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability remotely without authentication or user interaction, gaining unauthorized access to the cluster and potentially intercepting or injecting messages. The patch in version 1.5.52 enforces mutual TLS by default, requiring both client and server to present valid certificates signed with the same private key, and introduces fail-fast behavior if private keys are missing or invalid. Organizations running Akka.NET in private networks that rely on TLS for security are vulnerable if they have not upgraded. Workarounds include avoiding public exposure of Akka.NET services, but upgrading is strongly recommended to fully mitigate the risk. No known exploits are currently reported in the wild, but the high CVSS score (9.3) reflects the critical nature of the vulnerability and its potential for severe impact.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to the confidentiality and integrity of distributed applications built on Akka.NET. Unauthorized access to Akka.NET clusters could allow attackers to intercept sensitive data, manipulate message flows, or execute unauthorized commands within the cluster, potentially disrupting business-critical services. Industries such as finance, telecommunications, manufacturing, and public sector entities that use Akka.NET for distributed processing or microservices architectures are particularly at risk. The vulnerability's network-level exploitability without authentication means attackers can potentially gain footholds inside corporate networks or cloud environments. This could lead to lateral movement, data breaches, or service disruptions. Given Europe's stringent data protection regulations like GDPR, exploitation could also result in regulatory penalties and reputational damage. The lack of mutual TLS enforcement undermines the security assurances of TLS, making existing encryption deployments insufficient to prevent unauthorized access. Organizations that expose Akka.NET services externally or have weak network segmentation are especially vulnerable. The critical severity and ease of exploitation necessitate urgent remediation to prevent potential compromise.
Mitigation Recommendations
The primary mitigation is to upgrade all Akka.NET deployments to version 1.5.52 or later, which enforces mutual TLS by default and introduces fail-fast checks for private key validity. Organizations should audit their Akka.NET usage to identify affected versions and ensure timely patching. Network administrators should verify that TLS is properly configured with mutual authentication enabled, ensuring both client and server certificates are validated against trusted certificate authorities. Avoid exposing Akka.NET services directly to public networks; instead, restrict access via VPNs or secure internal networks with strict firewall rules. Implement network segmentation to isolate Akka.NET clusters from untrusted zones. Monitor network traffic for anomalous connections to Akka.NET ports and enable logging to detect unauthorized access attempts. Conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on Akka.NET components. Additionally, review certificate management practices to ensure private keys are securely stored and rotated regularly. Educate development and operations teams about the importance of mutual TLS and secure configuration to prevent similar issues in the future.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.1
- Assigner Short Name
- GitHub_M
- Date Reserved
- 2025-09-30T19:43:49.901Z
- Cvss Version
- 4.0
- State
- PUBLISHED
Threat ID: 68e3f641083a44572bca3745
Added to database: 10/6/2025, 5:02:57 PM
Last enriched: 10/6/2025, 5:16:15 PM
Last updated: 10/7/2025, 12:45:38 PM
Views: 11
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