CVE-2025-61929: CherryHQ cherry-studio · Code Injection
Affects CherryHQ cherry-studioSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.7 Critical.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 40% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 10 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| CherryHQ cherry-studio | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until an official patch is released, European organizations should implement specific mitigations to reduce risk: 1) Disable or unregister the cherrystudio:// custom protocol handler on all endpoints where cherry-studio is installed to prevent automatic processing of malicious URLs. 2) Educate users about the risks of clicking unknown or suspicious links, especially those using custom protocols, and implement strict email and web filtering to block or flag such URLs. 3) Employ endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to monitor for unusual command execution patterns indicative of exploitation attempts. 4) Restrict user permissions on affected systems to limit the impact of potential code execution. 5) Use application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution of commands or scripts spawned by cherry-studio. 6) Monitor network traffic for attempts to access or invoke the cherrystudio:// protocol. 7) Engage with CherryHQ for updates and prioritize patch deployment once available. 8) Consider isolating or sandboxing systems running cherry-studio to contain potential compromises. These targeted actions go beyond generic advice by focusing on the unique attack vector and application behavior.
Description
Cherry Studio is a desktop client that supports for multiple LLM providers. Cherry Studio registers a custom protocol called `cherrystudio://`. When handling the MCP installation URL, it parses the base64-encoded configuration data and directly executes the command within it. In the files `src/main/services/ProtocolClient.ts` and `src/main/services/urlschema/mcp-install.ts`, when receiving a URL of the `cherrystudio://mcp` type, the `handleMcpProtocolUrl` function is called for processing. If an attacker crafts malicious content and posts it on a website or elsewhere (there are many exploitation methods, such as creating a malicious website with a button containing this malicious content), when the user clicks it, since the pop-up window contains normal content, the direct click is considered a scene action, and the malicious command is directly triggered, leading to the user being compromised. As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.