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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-102759: Eclipse Foundation NetX Duo · Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

Affects Eclipse Foundation NetX DuoSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.3 Medium.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 29 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Eclipse FoundationNetX DuoAffected
  • >=6.2.0 <=6.5.1.202602
Fixed in–
GitHubeclipse-threadx/netxduopkg:github/eclipse-threadx/netxduoOther threatsAffected
  • >=6.2.0 <=6.5.1.202602
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, consider the risk in the context of your deployment and TLS usage. No vendor advisory states that no action is required or that the issue is already mitigated.

Description

CVE-2026-102759 is a medium severity vulnerability in Eclipse Foundation's NetX Duo where the NetX Secure TLS component improperly validates the integrity check value. Specifically, it accepts an empty TLS application-data record without verifying its message authentication code (MAC), treating such records as valid and advancing the receive sequence number without MAC comparison. Empty TLS application-data records are legal and commonly used in TLS 1.0 as a mitigation against the BEAST attack.

References

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