Threat database

The Web add-on's HTTP server searches the entire request packet for header fields instead of stopping at the end of the header section. A header field name placed in the request body is therefore reported to the server as though it were a header, which lets a client control request framing decisions it should not be able to reach.

A missing bounds check in the TLS 1.3 Certificate-message parser of NetX Secure lets a malicious TLS 1.3 server trigger an unsigned-integer underflow and a subsequent heap out-of-bounds read in any peer that processes a remote Certificate message. It is reachable pre-authentication, during the normal handshake, before certificate verification completes.

The TLS 1.3 Certificate-message parser in NetX Secure decrements the message length to skip a context byte without first establishing that the message has a byte to skip. A zero-length Certificate message therefore wraps the unsigned length to `0xFFFFFFFF`, which makes the bounds check that follows vacuous and sends the parser reading past the session packet buffer. The trigger is a four-byte handshake header and requires no cryptographic validity. It is reachable pre-authentication.

The Web add-on's HTTP server dereferences and releases an uninitialized pointer when it detects a `Content-Length` underflow while processing a `PUT` request. The condition is reachable by an unauthenticated remote client with a single malformed request.

The X.509 parser in NetX Secure accepts an RSA public key of any size, but every signature-verification path decrypts into fixed-size buffers dimensioned for the `NX_CRYPTO_MAX_RSA_MODULUS_SIZE` default of 4096 bits. A certificate carrying a larger modulus drives an out-of-bounds write past a file-scope static during ordinary certificate-chain verification. It is reachable pre-authentication. The issuer used for the crypto operation is looked up in the remote, peer-supplied store before the trusted store, so the attacker supplies the oversized key themselves as an intermediate in the chain they present. It triggers on a TLS or DTLS client verifying a malicious server's chain, and on a server performing client-certificate authentication.

CVE-2026-106465 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the Eclipse Foundation's NetX Duo product. The flaw arises because the DTLS server sends a HelloVerifyRequest with a cookie but does not properly verify the cookie returned by the client. Instead, the server only checks the cookie's length, allowing an attacker to bypass verification by including any single byte in the cookie field. This enables handshake completion without proper source address verification.

An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in Eclipse Foundation NetX Duo in the function _nx_secure_x509_parse_signature_data. The function calculates the certificate signature length without verifying that the length is non-zero, leading to a potential read past the buffer when parsing a certificate with an empty ASN.1 BIT STRING signature. This occurs during the TLS handshake with remote, unauthenticated input.

CVE-2026-103415 is a critical out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Eclipse Foundation's NetX Duo TLS 1.3 client implementation. When processing a HelloRetryRequest, the client copies the server's cookie into the second ClientHello message without verifying that the cookie fits within the allocated packet buffer. This flaw allows a malicious or compromised server to overwrite memory beyond the intended buffer before certificate authentication completes. Only the client-side TLS path is affected.

Out-of-bounds write via the TLS 1.3 handshake message cache in NetX Duo in Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo 6.5.1.202602 allows a handshake message larger than the cache writes past it and on into the rest of the session control block, which holds pointers. A malicious or compromised server can make a TLS 1.3 client produce such a message before certificate authentication completes, so no server certificate is needed to reach it.

CVE-2026-102717 is a high-severity vulnerability in Eclipse Foundation's NetX Duo affecting versions 6.4.4 through 6.5.1.202602. It involves an out-of-bounds read caused by an MQTT WebSocket setter ABI mismatch, which may lead to memory disclosure or application crashes.

FTP Passive Data Connection Not Bound to the Authenticated Control Peer

CVE-2026-102728 is a high-severity buffer over-read vulnerability in the Eclipse Foundation's NetX Duo library. It affects two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers that read server-supplied message fields before verifying the message length, leading to out-of-bounds reads. This flaw occurs when a TLS or DTLS client connects to a malicious or malformed server. The vulnerability has a CVSS score of 7.5, indicating significant confidentiality impact but no integrity or availability impact. Affected versions include all NetX Duo releases up to and including 6.5.1.202602.

Unbounded PPP IPCP Option Parsing Causes a Worker Stall and Out-of-bounds Read

Out-of-bounds Read from Unvalidated MSRP Attribute List Length

NULL Pointer Dereference When Evicting the Sole MSRP Attribute

NULL Pointer Dereference on MSRP Attribute Table Exhaustion

In the IPv4 PASV path, the FTP Client accepts whatever address was sent in the server's `227` reply. Validation only covers the parse and the non-zero values, thus a malicious server can name any address and direct the Client there.

A TFTP server that answers with a short ERROR packet makes the client read up to 64 bytes past the received datagram. Each receive path checks only that the datagram is at least four bytes long (nxd_tftp_client.c:1229, 1521, 1984). When the opcode is NX_TFTP_CODE_ERROR the message string is copied with a loop whose only limits are the destination buffer and a NUL byte: ```c /* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 */ for (i = 0; (i < (sizeof(tftp_client_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_error_string) - 1)) && (*buffer_ptr); i++) ``` Nothing compares `buffer_ptr` against `nx_packet_append_ptr`. An ERROR packet that carries no terminating NUL, which a server controls completely, walks the loop off the end of the packet until it happens to meet a zero byte or fills the 64 byte destination. ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x60d0000000c8 thread T4 #0 _nxd_tftp_client_file_read addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_client.c:1769 0x60d0000000c8 is 0 bytes to the right of 136-byte region ``` The open path has the same loop at :1327 and reports the same way. What is read lands in `nx_tftp_client_error_string`, which the application is expected to display or log, so adjacent packet pool memory ends up in whatever the device does with the error text. Add `(buffer_ptr < packet_ptr -> nx_packet_append_ptr)` to the loop condition in all three paths.

A DHCP server, or anyone on the LAN who answers a DISCOVER first, can make the client read about a kilobyte past the end of the received message. The option walk keeps a pointer and an offset in step, and the only bound check uses the offset: ```c /* addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7538, 7572 */ while (i < length - 1) { ... size = *(++data); /* data moves 1: type -> length byte */ data += size + 1; /* data moves size + 1 more */ i += size + 1; /* i moves only size + 1 */ } ``` A TLV option occupies size + 2 bytes. `data` is advanced by size + 2 in total, `i` by size + 1, so the offset falls one byte behind the real read position for every option the walk skips. After enough skipped options the check `i < length - 1` still holds while `data` is already past the end of the message, and the subsequent read of the type and length bytes comes from whatever follows. A single OFFER carrying a long run of skippable options is enough: ``` ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow READ of size 1 at 0x61b000000794 thread T5 #0 _nx_dhcp_search_buffer addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7541 #1 _nx_dhcp_get_option_value addons/dhcp/nxd_dhcp_client.c:7082 0x61b000000794 is located 164 bytes to the right of 1648-byte region ``` A well formed OFFER through the same path is handled normally, the client records the offer and moves to REQUESTING, so the difference is the option layout rather than the harness. The read runs in the DHCP client thread while the client is still unconfigured, so it happens on every boot in reach of a hostile DHCP responder. The values read are used to configure the interface, which is how the disclosed bytes become observable. Advance `i` by size + 2, or derive the bound from `data` rather than keeping a second counter.

Predictable DTLS HelloVerifyRequest Cookie in NetX Secure