Threats Tagged 'cwe-835'

CVE-2026-81885 is a resource exhaustion vulnerability in radare2 prior to version 6.2.0. The NE relocation fixup-chain parser lacks iteration limits or cycle detection, allowing crafted NE executables to cause repeated processing of the same relocation entry. This leads to continuous CPU and memory consumption, resulting in denial of service. The issue is fixed in radare2 version 6.2.0.

Net::IDN::Punycode versions before 2.590 for Perl hang, crash or return a wrong label via unvalidated malformed UTF-8 in encode_punycode. Neither backend checks that its input is well-formed UTF-8, so a string with the UTF-8 flag set over malformed bytes, as the :utf8 PerlIO layer produces from any malformed input, reaches the encoder unchecked. On perl 5.32 and later the XS backend reports a malformed sequence with a length of `(STRLEN)-1`, so the scan steps back one byte instead of forward and never ends. On earlier perls the XS returns a valid label for a different name. The pure-Perl backend runs a regex over the flagged string. Depending on the bytes, it aborts with SIGBUS on perl 5.28 and later, dies with a panic, or returns a wrong label. The documented conversion functions match the label against Unicode properties first and that match dies on such a string, so only a direct call to encode_punycode reaches the defect. The decoder is not affected. A direct caller encoding attacker-supplied bytes hangs, crashes or gets a label for a name the input never held.

Pod::Text versions before 6.1.1 for Perl allow CPU and memory exhaustion formatting a POD document whose =over nesting drives the margin to the output width. Each =over adds its indent to the margin, which wrap() subtracts from the output width to get the space available for text. When that space reaches zero, the line-splitting substitution matches the empty string, and the loop consumes no input while appending the margin padding on every pass. Formatting an attacker-supplied POD document never returns, and the output grows until memory is exhausted.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Prior to 1.23.2, crafted HEIF sequence timing and edit-list data can make Track::init_sample_timing_table() compute a logical m_num_output_samples value that exceeds the uint32_t counters used by Track_Visual::decode_next_image_sample() and Track::get_next_sample_raw_data(). The resulting comparison can never reach the oversized output count, causing non-terminating decode or raw-sample loops and bypassing max_sequence_frames. The same sequence path repeatedly calls Box_stts::get_sample_duration() and allocates Chunk::m_sample_ranges and Track::m_presentation_timeline outside MemoryHandle accounting, allowing severe CPU and memory exhaustion from a small file. This issue is fixed in version 1.23.2.

`fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.19.0, a body-direct child whose CSS-resolved height greatly exceeds the page height was sliced into one fragment per page with no upper bound. This is fixed in 0.19.0. A `MAX_PAGES` cap bounds the slice loop — halting it even for a `+inf` height — and non-finite layout heights are sanitized so they can no longer drive the loop. As a workaround, validate or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular `height` / `vh` on body-level elements) before passing HTML to fulgur.

`fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.19.0, a body-direct child whose CSS-resolved height greatly exceeds the page height was sliced into one fragment per page with no upper bound. This is fixed in version 0.19.0. A `MAX_PAGES` cap bounds the slice loop — halting it even for a `+inf` height — and non-finite layout heights are sanitized so they can no longer drive the loop. As a workaround, validate or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular `height` / `vh` on body-level elements) before passing HTML to fulgur.

ExifReader is a JavaScript Exif information parser. Prior to 4.41.1, ExifReader parses attacker-controlled HEIC or AVIF ISO-BMFF files in getItems() within src/image-header-iso-bmff-iloc.js and trusts iloc itemCount and extentCount values while allocating an extent object for every nested-loop iteration. When offsetSize, lengthSize, baseOffsetSize, and indexSize are zero, the extent fields consume no input bytes and the buffer offset does not advance, but the parser can still allocate up to itemCount multiplied by extentCount objects without an allocation budget. A small malicious iloc box can therefore cause hundreds of megabytes of heap growth or exhaust system memory, terminating a Node.js process and denying service to web, desktop, or mobile applications that parse untrusted images. The zero field widths are valid ISO-BMFF values indicating absent fields, so the vulnerable parser must bound work rather than relying on offset advancement. The issue is fixed in version 4.41.1.

AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.

HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.12, SHCParser in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java can enter an infinite loop while processing attacker-controlled Smart Health Card JWT content whose header contains zip: "DEF" and whose raw-DEFLATE payload is empty or truncated. SHCParser.decodeJWT() reaches SHCParser.inflate(), where Inflater.inflate() can return zero while Inflater.finished() remains false and Inflater.needsInput() is true. The loop also lacks an Inflater.needsDictionary() termination check, SHCParser.decompress() contains the same zero-progress pattern, and ResourceChecker.java can reach SHC parsing during file-format detection. A malformed validation request can pin a JVM worker thread indefinitely, and concurrent requests can exhaust all validation workers. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.12.

react/http is an event-driven, streaming HTTP client and server implementation for ReactPHP. From 0.6.0 until 1.11.1, React\Http\Io\ChunkedDecoder could enter an infinite loop while processing a malformed Transfer-Encoding: chunked body because handleData required its buffer to shrink on every iteration. An incomplete terminal-chunk trailer without CRLF left the buffer unchanged after strpos returned false, and exactly two non-CRLF bytes after a completed non-terminal chunk bypassed both the error and wait guards. The affected decoder processes request bodies for React\Http\HttpServer and response bodies for React\Http\Browser, allowing a malicious client to freeze a server or a malicious or compromised server to freeze a client. A reverse proxy that normalizes inbound requests may protect the server direction but does not protect outbound Browser requests. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.1.