Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-8798'
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Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-8798'
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0 A vulnerability in Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before version 2.1.3 causes the native entropy source on Intel platforms to retry CPU entropy instructions indefinitely if they fail persistently. This results in an uninterruptible hang in the JNI seeding routine, potentially causing denial of service for applications relying on this entropy source. The issue is fixed by bounding retry attempts and throwing an exception on exhaustion. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) and earlier FIPS series 1.0.X and 2.0.X are not affected. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 08/08/2026, 00:50:56 UTC Added: 08/08/2026, 14:51:50 UTC |
0 In Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bc-fips 2.1.3, the native entropy source used on Intel platforms retried the CPU entropy instructions without any bound. RDSEED and RDRAND report failure through their carry flag, and the JNI seeding routine spun re-issuing the instruction for as long as that flag stayed clear, so a persistent failure of the on-chip entropy source - whether from a hardware fault, from the underlying DRBG being exhausted by contention across many cores, or from a hypervisor that does not provide the instruction - left the calling thread looping indefinitely inside the JNI call, where it could be neither interrupted nor timed out. Any operation drawing from the native entropy source could therefore hang, denying service to the application. The retry loops are now bounded (200 attempts for RDSEED and 20 for RDRAND, twice the baselines given in Intel's Digital Random Number Generator software implementation guide), pausing between attempts and, on exhaustion, clearing any partially written buffer and throwing rather than continuing to spin. The clear is performed by an un-elidable memzero, which uses a volatile pointer and an assembly memory barrier so that a compiler cannot optimise the erase away as a dead store. Bouncy Castle for Java (bcprov) is not affected, as it has no native entropy source; the 1.0.X and 2.0.X FIPS series are not affected. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 08/08/2026, 00:50:56 UTC Added: 08/08/2026, 00:56:45 UTC |
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