CVE-2026-104854: nrwl nx · Improper Privilege Management
Affects nrwl nxSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.5 High : upgrade to 23.1.2 or 22.7.9 soon.
Data as of 15 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 23.1.2, 22.7.9
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 15 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade nrwl nx to 23.1.2 or 22.7.9.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nrwlnx | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| nrwlnx | Affected
| Fixed in
|
AI-suggested
Upgrade Nx to versions 22.7.9 or 23.1.2 where this vulnerability is fixed. Disabling the daemon alone is insufficient as plugin-worker sockets remain vulnerable. Ensure that the environment is not shared with untrusted local users to reduce exposure until patched.
Description
Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2.
References
- github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-w3vv-58gj-gw77 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/36370 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/3298fd8b2dd066167eb3cc0410643994a59b0bba (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/63e1abb287a3d69f8ba981828a1de325d0d3dc68 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/commit/71c2253b6aac23b008e192c4e2642c42a5e07545 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/22.7.9 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nrwl/nx/releases/tag/23.1.2 (opens in a new tab)