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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-104854: nrwl nx · Improper Privilege Management

Affects nrwl nxSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.5 High : upgrade to 23.1.2 or 22.7.9 soon.

Data as of 15 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 23.1.2, 22.7.9
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 15 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade nrwl nx to 23.1.2 or 22.7.9.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
nrwlnxAffected
  • >=23.0.0 <23.1.2
Fixed in
  • 23.1.2
nrwlnxAffected
  • >=14.6.0 <22.7.9
Fixed in
  • 22.7.9

AI-suggested

Upgrade Nx to versions 22.7.9 or 23.1.2 where this vulnerability is fixed. Disabling the daemon alone is insufficient as plugin-worker sockets remain vulnerable. Ensure that the environment is not shared with untrusted local users to reduce exposure until patched.

Description

Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 14.6.0 until 22.7.9 and 23.1.2, Nx creates Unix domain sockets for its daemon and isolated plugin workers in shared temporary locations without owner-only directory and socket permissions. Another unprivileged local account on a shared build server, developer host, or multi-user container can discover and connect to a running socket because the transport performs no authentication and relies on filesystem containment. The daemon's PROCESS_IN_BACKGROUND request accepts a module path and invokes its default export, allowing a caller that controls a file to execute code as the account running Nx; other handlers can expose workspace file contents, project graphs, and task hashes. Disabling the daemon alone does not remove the vulnerable plugin-worker sockets, while single-user machines without another local account are not exposed. This issue is fixed in versions 22.7.9 and 23.1.2.

References

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