CVE-2026-54753: nrwl nx · Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
Affects nrwl nxSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 23.0.0-beta.2 or 22.7.2 when convenient.
Data as of 8 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 1.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 73% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 23.0.0-beta.2, 22.7.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 26 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 8 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade nrwl nx to 23.0.0-beta.2 or 22.7.2.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| nrwlnx | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| nrwlnx | Affected
| Fixed in
|
AI-suggested
A fix is available in nrwl nx versions 22.7.2 and later, and 23.0.0 and later (including 23.0.0-beta.2). Users running affected versions (>=17.0.4 <22.7.2 and >=23.0.0-beta.0 <23.0.0-beta.2) should upgrade to these patched versions to remove the wildcard CORS header and prevent cross-origin information disclosure. The vendor advisory confirms the fix and no additional mitigations are required beyond upgrading. The 21.x line is unpatched and should be upgraded as well.
Description
## Summary The local HTTP server started by `nx graph` sent `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server's responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the `/help` endpoint, which runs a target's configured help command. The practical impact is typically **cross-origin information disclosure**, but can be arbitrary command injection in rare cases. ## Severity Exploitation requires the developer to be running `nx graph` and to visit an attacker page. Any execution beyond benign help commands also requires a malicious target to already be present in the workspace (see Details). ## Affected & Patched Versions Package: `nx` (npm). - **Affected:** `>= 17.0.4, < 22.7.2` and `>= 23.0.0-beta.0, < 23.0.0-beta.2` - **Patched:** `22.7.2`+ (backport) and `23.0.0` (first in `23.0.0-beta.2`) The wildcard CORS header was introduced in `17.0.4`; the `/help` execution endpoint in `19.4.0`. **The `21.x` line is not patched** — `21.x` users should upgrade to `22.7.2` or later. ## Details `nx graph` starts a local server (default `http://127.0.0.1:4211`). Before the fix, its request handler set a wildcard CORS header on every response: ```ts res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*'); ``` The `/help` endpoint runs a target's configured command: ```ts const command = target.metadata?.help?.command; return execSync(command, { cwd: target.options?.cwd ?? workspaceRoot }).toString(); ``` A `GET /help` is a CORS "simple request", so a malicious page could `fetch()` it with no preflight, and the wildcard header let the page read the result. This exposes the project graph (project names, file paths, dependencies, build configuration) and the output of any configured help command. The command is not attacker-controlled through the request — it comes from the workspace's project configuration, and first-party plugins (jest, vite, cypress) populate it with benign, read-only help commands. For `/help` to run anything malicious, a target carrying a malicious `help.command` must already exist in the project graph, which can only be introduced by **installing a malicious package** or by **altering the workspace's own code/configuration** — both of which already grant code execution independent of this flaw. The fix ([#35494](https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/35494)) removes the header; the browser's same-origin policy then blocks cross-origin reads. ## References - Fix: [nrwl/nx#35494](https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/35494) - Introduced: [nrwl/nx#20744](https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/20744) (CORS), [nrwl/nx#26629](https://github.com/nrwl/nx/pull/26629) (`/help`) ## Credits Thanks to Nozomu Sasaki (Paul) ([@morimori-dev](https://github.com/morimori-dev)) for finding and responsibly reporting this issue.