CVE-2026-112880: benoitc hackney · HTTP Request/Response Splitting
Affects benoitc hackneySource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.1 Low : upgrade to 4.9.0 when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 16:53 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.9.0, 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 26 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade hackney to 4.9.0; hackney to 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| benoitchackney | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| hackneybenoitc/hackney | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Hexhackneypkg:hex/hackneyOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
CPE configurations (1)
cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade hackney to version 4.9.0 or later, where this vulnerability is fixed. The fix ensures proper sanitization of the proxy_auth_fun callback's return value before insertion into HTTP headers. No other mitigation is required as the issue is resolved in the official patch.
Description
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
References
- github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0 (opens in a new tab)
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html (opens in a new tab)
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-112880 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9 (opens in a new tab)