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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-1582: WP All Export – Drag & Drop Export to Any Custom CSV, XML & Excel · Information Exposure

Affects WP All Export – Drag & Drop Export to Any Custom CSV, XML & ExcelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.7 Low.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 09:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
3.7Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 26% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Feb 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
soflyyWP All Export – Drag & Drop Export to Any Custom CSV, XML & ExcelAffected
  • <=1.4.14
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict access to the export download endpoint and monitor for unauthorized access attempts. Avoid relying on the affected plugin versions for sensitive data exports. Follow vendor updates closely for any released patches or official fixes.

Description

The WP All Export plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.14 via the export download endpoint. This is due to a PHP type juggling vulnerability in the security token comparison which uses loose comparison (==) instead of strict comparison (===). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication using "magic hash" values when the expected MD5 hash prefix happens to be numeric-looking (matching pattern ^0e\d+$), allowing download of sensitive export files containing PII, business data, or database information.

References

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