CVE-2026-16516: wolfSSL wolfSSH · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affects wolfSSL wolfSSHSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.0 Critical : upgrade to 1.6.0 as a priority.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.6.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 7 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 20 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade wolfSSL wolfSSH to 1.6.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL Inc.wolfSSH | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubwolfSSHpkg:github/wolfSSHOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, users should ensure strict public key verification callbacks that validate both the algorithm and key fingerprint, avoiding lax checks such as TOFU or algorithm-name-only verification. Monitoring vendor advisories for updates and applying official patches once released is recommended.
Description
wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDH_REPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key).