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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-16516: wolfSSL wolfSSH · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affects wolfSSL wolfSSHSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.0 Critical : upgrade to 1.6.0 as a priority.

Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.0Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.6.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:H/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 7 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 20 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade wolfSSL wolfSSH to 1.6.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
wolfSSL Inc.wolfSSHAffected
  • <1.6.0
Fixed in
  • 1.6.0
GitHubwolfSSHpkg:github/wolfSSHOther threatsAffected
  • <1.6.0
Fixed in
  • 1.6.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, users should ensure strict public key verification callbacks that validate both the algorithm and key fingerprint, avoiding lax checks such as TOFU or algorithm-name-only verification. Monitoring vendor advisories for updates and applying official patches once released is recommended.

Description

wolfSSH does not validate that the ECDSA curve identifier in a KEXDH_REPLY host key blob matches the algorithm negotiated during key exchange. In ParseECCPubKey() (src/internal.c), the blob's algorithm string is used to derive the curve via NameToId/wcPrimeForId without checking against the negotiated ssh->handshake->pubKeyId, and the RFC 5656 curve identifier string is discarded via GetSkip() rather than compared. An active network man-in-the-middle attacker can substitute a host key blob containing a different ECDSA curve, causing the client to import the key on the wrong curve. Because the attacker controls the private key for the substituted curve, signature verification passes. Exploitation requires an active MitM position and a lax public key check callback (e.g., TOFU, algorithm-name-only check, or fingerprint match against the parsed key).

References

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