CVE-2026-84897: wolfSSL wolfSSH · Incomplete Internal State Distinction
Affects wolfSSL wolfSSHSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 1.6.0 when convenient.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.6.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/AU:YExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 7 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 20 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade wolfSSL wolfSSH to 1.6.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL Inc.wolfSSH | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubwolfSSHpkg:github/wolfSSHOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, WOLFSSH_NO_DH, or NO_SHA256 are not affected by this issue. Users should monitor wolfSSL Inc. advisories for official fixes or updates addressing this vulnerability. If you cannot patch yet, consider disabling the Diffie-Hellman group exchange SHA256 feature if feasible.
Description
src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected.