CVE-2026-17576: InfiniteWP Client (WordPress plugin) · SQL Injection
Affects InfiniteWP Client (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.
Data as of 2 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 40% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| revmakxInfiniteWP Client | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Administrators should restrict access to trusted users only and monitor for unusual activity. Check the vendor advisory for updates on patches or official remediation. Since this requires administrator-level access, limiting administrative accounts and using strong authentication reduces risk.
Description
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05c50442-570b-45cf-816a-c7a5b712ba21?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&old=3655042%40iwp-client&new=3655042%40iwp-client (opens in a new tab)