CVE-2026-24027: PowerDNS Recursor · Network Amplification
Affects PowerDNS RecursorSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium · fixed in 5.3.5 : update PowerDNS Recursor when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 38% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 5.3.5, 5.2.8, 5.1.10
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Feb 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Recursor and pdns-recursor to 5.3.5, 5.2.8 or 5.1.10.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| PowerDNSRecursor | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| PowerDNSRecursor | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| PowerDNSRecursor | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubpdns-recursorpkg:github/pdns-recursorOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Organizations should monitor PowerDNS Recursor deployments and verify if affected versions (5.1.0, 5.2.0, 5.3.0) are in use. 2) Implementing network-level rate limiting and traffic shaping to detect and throttle abnormal DNS query volumes that could indicate amplification attempts. 3) Deploying DNS response rate limiting (RRL) features if supported by PowerDNS or upstream network devices to reduce amplification potential. 4) Monitoring DNS traffic patterns for unusual spikes or crafted zone queries indicative of exploitation attempts. 5) Employing upstream filtering and ingress/egress controls to block spoofed or malicious traffic sources. 6) Engaging with ISPs and security vendors to share threat intelligence and coordinate defensive measures. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on traffic control and proactive monitoring tailored to the amplification nature of this vulnerability.
Description
Crafted zones can lead to increased incoming network traffic.