CVE-2026-2918: Happy Addons for Elementor (WordPress plugin) · Insecure Direct Object Reference
Affects Happy Addons for Elementor (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.4 Medium.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 9% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 11 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| thehappymonsterHappy Addons for Elementor | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, restrict Contributor-level access to trusted users only. Monitor updates from thehappymonster for an official patch addressing the authorization bypass and stored XSS issues. Avoid administrators accessing the Template Conditions panel from untrusted environments to reduce risk of stored XSS exploitation.
Description
The Happy Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.21.0 via the `ha_condition_update` AJAX action. This is due to the `validate_reqeust()` method using `current_user_can('edit_posts', $template_id)` instead of `current_user_can('edit_post', $template_id)` — failing to perform object-level authorization. Additionally, the `ha_get_current_condition` AJAX action lacks a capability check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to modify the display conditions of any published `ha_library` template. Because the `cond_to_html()` renderer outputs condition values into HTML attributes without proper escaping (using string concatenation instead of `esc_attr()`), an attacker can inject event handler attributes (e.g., `onmouseover`) that execute JavaScript when an administrator views the Template Conditions panel, resulting in Stored Cross-Site Scripting.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1a3fe49b-cc0d-4b29-aae5-46307483b8d4?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/condition-manager.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/tags/3.20.7/classes/condition-manager.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/condition-manager.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/happy-elementor-addons/trunk/classes/condition-manager.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=&sfph_mail=&reponame=&new=3475242%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk&old=3463375%40happy-elementor-addons%2Ftrunk&sfp_email=&sfph_mail= (opens in a new tab)