CVE-2026-41488: langchain-openai · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affects langchain-openaiSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.1 Low : upgrade to 1.1.14 when convenient.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.1.14
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 24 Apr 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Upgrade langchain-openai to 1.1.14.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| langchain-ailangchain-openai | Affected
| Fixed in
|
PyPIlangchain-openaipkg:pypi/langchain-openaiOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Since the vulnerability affects versions prior to 1.1.14, upgrading to version 1.1.14 or later (if available) is recommended once confirmed. If you cannot patch yet, consider restricting outbound network requests from the affected component or implementing additional network-level protections to prevent SSRF exploitation.
Description
LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.