CVE-2026-32231: qhkm zeptoclaw · Missing Authentication
Affects qhkm zeptoclawSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 0.7.6 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.7.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade zeptoclaw and qhkm/zeptoclaw to 0.7.6.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| qhkmzeptoclaw | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubqhkm/zeptoclawpkg:github/qhkm/zeptoclawOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
- Upgrade all ZeptoClaw deployments to version 0.7.6 or later immediately to apply the official fix that enforces authentication on webhook requests.
- If upgrading is not immediately possible, implement network-level controls such as IP whitelisting or firewall rules to restrict access to the /webhook endpoint only to trusted sources.
- Introduce additional validation layers on incoming webhook requests to verify the authenticity and integrity of identity fields beyond relying solely on the application’s default mechanisms.
- Monitor webhook traffic for anomalous patterns, such as unexpected sender or chat_id values, to detect potential exploitation attempts.
- Employ logging and alerting on webhook endpoint access to facilitate rapid incident response.
- Review and harden any downstream systems or integrations that consume ZeptoClaw webhook data to ensure they do not blindly trust incoming messages.
- Educate development and security teams about the risks of missing authentication on critical functions and enforce secure coding practices for webhook implementations.
Description
ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, the generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.6.
References
- github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/pull/324 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/bf004a20d3687a0c1a9e052ec79536e30d6de134 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6 (opens in a new tab)