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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-32231: qhkm zeptoclaw · Missing Authentication

Affects qhkm zeptoclawSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 0.7.6 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.7.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 12 Mar 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zeptoclaw and qhkm/zeptoclaw to 0.7.6.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
qhkmzeptoclawAffected
  • <0.7.6
Fixed in
  • 0.7.6
GitHubqhkm/zeptoclawpkg:github/qhkm/zeptoclawOther threatsAffected
  • <0.7.6
Fixed in
  • 0.7.6

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

  1. Upgrade all ZeptoClaw deployments to version 0.7.6 or later immediately to apply the official fix that enforces authentication on webhook requests.
  2. If upgrading is not immediately possible, implement network-level controls such as IP whitelisting or firewall rules to restrict access to the /webhook endpoint only to trusted sources.
  3. Introduce additional validation layers on incoming webhook requests to verify the authenticity and integrity of identity fields beyond relying solely on the application’s default mechanisms.
  4. Monitor webhook traffic for anomalous patterns, such as unexpected sender or chat_id values, to detect potential exploitation attempts.
  5. Employ logging and alerting on webhook endpoint access to facilitate rapid incident response.
  6. Review and harden any downstream systems or integrations that consume ZeptoClaw webhook data to ensure they do not blindly trust incoming messages.
  7. Educate development and security teams about the risks of missing authentication on critical functions and enforce secure coding practices for webhook implementations.

Description

ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, the generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.6.

References

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