CVE-2026-3255: TOKUHIROM HTTP::Session2 · Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers
Affects TOKUHIROM HTTP::Session2Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium : upgrade to 1.12 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 39% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.12
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 Feb 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade HTTP::Session2 and HTTP-Session2 to 1.12.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| TOKUHIROMHTTP::Session2 | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubHTTP-Session2pkg:github/HTTP-Session2Other threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Organizations should upgrade HTTP::Session2 to version 1.12 or later, ensuring that the module uses cryptographically secure random number generators without fallback to insecure methods. For environments where /dev/urandom is unavailable (e.g., Windows), verify that the module does not revert to the weak rand() based method or consider patching the module to enforce secure randomness sources. Additionally, implement defense-in-depth by enforcing short session lifetimes, binding sessions to client IP addresses or user agents where feasible, and monitoring for anomalous session activity. Web applications should also consider integrating alternative session management libraries that guarantee cryptographically secure session ID generation. Regularly audit and test session management mechanisms for randomness quality and resistance to prediction attacks. Finally, ensure HTTP headers do not leak epoch time or other predictable values that could aid attackers in guessing session IDs.
Description
HTTP::Session2 versions before 1.12 for Perl for Perl may generate weak session ids using the rand() function. The HTTP::Session2 session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with the built-in rand function, the epoch time, and the PID. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand() function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. HTTP::Session2 after version 1.02 will attempt to use the /dev/urandom device to generate a session id, but if the device is unavailable (for example, under Windows), then it will revert to the insecure method described above.
References
- metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.11/source/lib/HTTP/Session2/Random.pm (opens in a new tab)
- metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.01/source/lib/HTTP/Session2/ServerStore.pm (opens in a new tab)
- metacpan.org/release/TOKUHIROM/HTTP-Session2-1.12/changes (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tokuhirom/HTTP-Session2/commit/9cfde4d7e0965172aef5dcfa3b03bb48df93e636.patch (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/02/27/12 (opens in a new tab)