CVE-2026-43866: Apache Camel · Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Affects Apache CamelSource CVE Database V5
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.3 High · fixed in 4.21.0 : patch Apache Camel soon.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 52% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.21.0, 4.18.3, 4.14.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Apache to 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-jmspkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-jmsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-sjmspkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-sjmsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available by upgrading Apache Camel to version 4.21.0, 4.14.8 (for 4.14.x LTS), or 4.18.3 (for 4.18.x releases). These versions disable JMS ObjectMessage deserialization by default via the new objectMessageEnabled option, which must be explicitly enabled only when consuming JMS destinations fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments unable to upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to JMS queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers using JMS broker authorization. Avoid exposing JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks. Note that JMS-provider deserialization allow-lists do not mitigate this bypass since the crafted payload uses only universally trusted classes.
Description
Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, JMS ObjectMessage handling is disabled by default in camel-jms, camel-sjms and the JMS-family components (a new objectMessageEnabled option defaults to false at the component and endpoint level), so an incoming ObjectMessage - including a DefaultExchangeHolder payload - is no longer deserialized unless the option is explicitly enabled; only set objectMessageEnabled=true when the consumed JMS destination is fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization, and do not expose JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks; a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes.