Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-43866'

Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka, based on the Apache Kafka project, offers a distributed backbone that allows microservices and other applications to share data with extremely high throughput and extremely low latency. This release of Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.2.1 serves as a replacement for Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.2.0, and includes security and bug fixes, and enhancements. Security Fix(es): * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Go crypto/tls: Denial of Service via multiple TLS 1.3 key update messages (CVE-2026-32283) * quarkus-vertx-http: io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx-http: Authorization bypass via semicolons in HTTP requests (CVE-2026-39852) * kafka-clients: Apache Kafka Clients: Information disclosure and data corruption due to race condition in producer buffer management (CVE-2026-35554) * log4j-layout-template-json: Apache Log4j JsonTemplateLayout: Denial of Service via invalid JSON output (CVE-2026-34481) * log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output causes denial of service in logging (CVE-2026-34480) * log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via CRLF sequences due to configuration attribute renames (CVE-2026-34478) * netty-codec-dns: Netty: High integrity impact due to improper DNS domain name constraint enforcement (CVE-2026-42579) * netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion (CVE-2026-42584) * netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers (CVE-2026-42581) * netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation (CVE-2026-42578) * netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression (CVE-2026-42587) * netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression (CVE-2026-42587) * netty-codec: Netty: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in LZ4FrameDecoder (CVE-2026-42583) * netty-codec-compression: Netty: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in LZ4FrameDecoder (CVE-2026-42583) * next: Next.js: Authorization bypass via crafted query parameters (CVE-2026-44574) * next: Next.js: Denial of Service via crafted POST requests to server actions (CVE-2026-44579) * next: Next.js: Denial of Service via Image Optimization API (CVE-2026-44577) * next: Next.js: Information disclosure due to middleware bypass in Pages Router with i18n (CVE-2026-44573) * next: Next.js: Server-Side Request Forgery via crafted WebSocket upgrade requests (CVE-2026-44578) * next: Next.js: Information disclosure via security fix bypass in middleware with Turbopack (CVE-2026-45109) * next: Next.js: Unauthorized access to protected content via middleware bypass (CVE-2026-44575) * quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters (CVE-2026-50559) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821) * vertx-core: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name (CVE-2026-6860) * netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation (CVE-2026-44249) * netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message (CVE-2026-44893) * netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak (CVE-2026-48043) * netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers (CVE-2026-48059) * netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records (CVE-2026-47691) * netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation (CVE-2026-45674) * netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake (CVE-2026-45416) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811) * cluster-operator: Cross-namespace privilege escalation via Kafka.spec.entityOperator.watchedNamespace in Strimzi (CVE-2026-55225) * micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests (CVE-2026-40984) * micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted gRPC requests (CVE-2026-40983) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: golang crypto/x509: Denial of Service via excessive processing of DNS SAN entries (CVE-2026-27145) * jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass (CVE-2026-54512) * jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON processing (CVE-2026-50193) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header (CVE-2026-42504) * jacks

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, JMS ObjectMessage handling is disabled by default in camel-jms, camel-sjms and the JMS-family components (a new objectMessageEnabled option defaults to false at the component and endpoint level), so an incoming ObjectMessage - including a DefaultExchangeHolder payload - is no longer deserialized unless the option is explicitly enabled; only set objectMessageEnabled=true when the consumed JMS destination is fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization, and do not expose JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks; a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes.