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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-5589: zephyrproject-rtos Zephyr · Out-of-bounds Write

Affects zephyrproject-rtos ZephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.3 Medium : upgrade to 4.3.1 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 17% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 4 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject-rtos Zephyr to 4.3.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
zephyrproject-rtosZephyrAffected
  • <4.3.1
Fixed in
  • 4.3.1
GitHubZephyrpkg:github/ZephyrOther threatsAffected
  • <4.3.1
Fixed in
  • 4.3.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, consider disabling the CONFIG_BT_MESH_OD_PRIV_PROXY_SRV feature if feasible to mitigate exposure.

Description

An integer underflow in bt_mesh_sol_recv() in the Bluetooth Mesh solicitation handling (subsys/bluetooth/mesh/solicitation.c) leads to an out-of-bounds write. When CONFIG_BT_MESH_OD_PRIV_PROXY_SRV is enabled, the function parses solicitation PDUs from raw BLE advertising payloads. The AD parsing loop reads an attacker-controlled length byte (reported_len) and computes reported_len - 3 without checking that reported_len >= 3. When reported_len is less than 3, the subtraction is performed in signed int arithmetic and yields a negative value that bypasses the length guard and is then implicitly converted to a very large size_t when passed to net_buf_simple_pull_mem(). In builds without assertions, this wraps the buffer length and advances the data pointer far out of bounds, so subsequent reads dereference invalid memory. A nearby BLE device can trigger this with a non-connectable advertisement carrying a UUID16 AD structure and a crafted length byte, with no pairing or prior association required, potentially leading to denial of service or arbitrary code execution.

References

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