The Apache Camel Iggy consumer component improperly maps user-supplied message headers into the Camel Exchange header map without filtering. This allows an attacker able to publish to the Iggy stream/topic to inject Camel control headers such as CamelHttpUri. When the Iggy consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri causes the server-side HTTP request to be redirected to an attacker-controlled destination, enabling SSRF. Furthermore, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders in the attacker-controlled URI, leaking sensitive environment variables, application properties, and vault secrets. The vulnerability affects Apache Camel versions >=4.17.0 <4.18.3 and >=4.19.0 <4.21.0. The issue is fixed in versions 4.18.3 and 4.21.0 by introducing a case-insensitive header filter strategy that blocks externally supplied Camel* headers from being copied into the Exchange. For users unable to upgrade immediately, recommended mitigations include stripping Camel control headers from inbound messages, restricting publishing access to the Iggy stream/topic, and avoiding direct bridging of untrusted consumers into HTTP producers with header-driven URIs.

An attacker with the ability to publish to the Iggy stream/topic can exploit this vulnerability to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF), redirecting server-side HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations, including internal services or cloud metadata endpoints. Additionally, the attacker can cause disclosure of sensitive information such as environment variables, application properties, and vault secrets by injecting placeholders in the URI that are resolved by the HTTP producer. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive internal data and potential further compromise of the affected system.

A fix is available in Apache Camel versions 4.18.3 and 4.21.0, which add a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy to block externally supplied Camel* headers. Users are strongly recommended to upgrade to these fixed versions. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, mitigations include stripping Camel control headers (e.g., removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*')) at the start of the route, restricting who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoiding bridging untrusted consumers directly into HTTP producers where the target URI is driven from message headers.