CVE-2026-55994: Apache Camel Iggy · Improper Input Validation
Affects Apache Camel IggySource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 4.21.0 or 4.18.3 soon.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 50% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.21.0, 4.18.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Apache to 4.21.0 or 4.18.3.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel Iggy | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel Iggy | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-iggypkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-iggyOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in Apache Camel versions 4.18.3 and 4.21.0, which add a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy to block externally supplied Camel* headers. Users are strongly recommended to upgrade to these fixed versions. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, mitigations include stripping Camel control headers (e.g., removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*')) at the start of the route, restricting who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoiding bridging untrusted consumers directly into HTTP producers where the target URI is driven from message headers.
Description
Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Apache Camel in Iggy component. The camel-iggy consumer mapped the user-headers of inbound Iggy messages into the Camel Exchange header map without applying any HeaderFilterStrategy (IggyFetchRecords copied the message user-headers straight into the Exchange). Because nothing blocked the Camel header namespace, an actor able to publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic could set Camel-internal control headers - including CamelHttpUri (Exchange.HTTP_URI) - simply by supplying them as message user-headers. In a route where the Iggy consumer feeds a downstream HTTP producer, the injected CamelHttpUri redirects the server-side HTTP request to an attacker-chosen destination (server-side request forgery - for example to an internal service or a cloud metadata endpoint). In addition, the HTTP producer resolves Camel property placeholders on the resulting (attacker-controlled) URI, so placeholders embedded in the injected value - such as an environment-variable reference, an application property, or a vault reference - are resolved to their real values and sent to the attacker, disclosing environment variables, application properties and vault secrets. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.17.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix adds a dedicated IggyHeaderFilterStrategy (and a headerFilterStrategy endpoint option) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so externally-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from the inbound message before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), restrict who can publish to the consumed Iggy stream/topic, and avoid bridging an untrusted consumer directly into an HTTP producer whose target URI can be driven from message headers.