CVE-2026-57586: naranor agent-coderag · OS Command Injection
Affects naranor agent-coderagSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.6 High : upgrade to 1.3.1 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 11% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.3.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade agent-coderag and naranor/agent-coderag to 1.3.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| naranoragent-coderag | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubnaranor/agent-coderagpkg:github/naranor/agent-coderagOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade agent-coderag to version 1.3.1 or later, where this vulnerability is fixed. Until then, avoid indexing untrusted or attacker-controlled Gradle repositories to prevent execution of malicious gradlew executables. No other mitigations are specified.
Description
CodeRAG is a lightweight semantic code search and distillation utility for AI coding agents. Prior to 1.3.1, the default agent-coderag sync flow in code_rag/entry/cli.py calls sync_dependencies for an indexed path, and code_rag/core/manager.py treats build.gradle or build.gradle.kts as sufficient to invoke _sync_gradle. _sync_gradle prefers a repository-controlled gradlew or gradlew.bat file and passes it directly to asyncio.create_subprocess_exec with the repository root as the working directory; validate_path in code_rag/core/utils.py constrains the directory location but does not validate the executable's content or integrity. A victim who indexes an attacker-controlled Gradle repository therefore executes attacker-supplied code with the victim's operating-system privileges, allowing disclosure, modification, persistence, or denial of service in the user environment. This issue is fixed in 1.3.1.